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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2751 
MINNIE E. KNIGHT, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
THE PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK OF LYNCHBURG, 
B. E. HUGHES, DOROTHY HUGHES AND CITY 
OF LYNCHBURG, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
Defendants in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAB 
To the Honorable Chief J1-tstice mid Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Ooittrt of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Minnie E. Knight, respectfully represents 
that she is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, entered on 
April 26, 1943, in favor of The Peoples National Bank of 
Lynchburg, Virginia, and against her, in the sum of $1,833.36, 
in a certain proceeding at law wherein The Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg, B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes were 
the plaintiffs and your petitioner and City of Lynchburg were 
the defendants. A transcript of the record of this case, duly 
certified according to law, is filed herewith and made a part 
of this petition. 
2• ~In this petition the parties will be referred to either 
hr n~m~ or according to the position occupied by 0&94 
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of them in the trial court, or as follows : Minnie E. Knight, 
as Petitioner; The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, as 
the Bank~ B. E. Hughes as Assignor; Dorothy Hughes as As-
signee;· and City of Lynchburg, as the City. 
I. 
ST.A. TEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The proceeding was instituted by a notice of motion for 
judgment brought by the Bank against the City for the sum 
of $1,833.36, returnable to the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on February 8, 1943, in which 
it was alleged that the amount sued for was the balance due 
by the City on the contract with B. E. Hughes, as assessor 
of real estate, and which had been assigned by the said 
Hughes to Dorothy Hughes, his daughter, and reassigned by 
her to the Bank. 
The City filed an affidavit, in accordance with Section '6151 
of the Code of Virginia, stating that it had no interest in 
the sum of $1,833.36, the balance due by it to B. E. Hug·hes, 
but that your petitioner had asserted a claim thereto and 
had served the City with certain notices of execution on the 
judgment in her favor against the said B. E. Hughes and 
the City requested the Court to enter an order requiring your 
petitioner to appear before the Court and state the nature 
of her claim to the fund of $1,833.36 and maintain or re-
linquish it and pursuant thereto such an order was entered 
on February 8, 1943, requiring your petitioner to appear on 
February 18, 19'43. 
Your petitioner, pursuant to said order and on February 
18, 1943, filed her petition asking· the Court to award her 
3* the fund of $1,833.36, due by *the City to B. E. Hughes, 
as balance due for his services as tax assessor, because 
her judgment was a valid and subsisting lien against the 
fund and prior to the claim of the Bank, as the assignment, 
under which the Bank claimed the balance of the fund due 
B. E. Hughes, was void, illegal and unenforceable as it failed 
to comply with Section 6555-a of the Code of Virginia; be-
cause it was an assignment of the unearned compensation 
of a tax assessor and against public policy; and because it 
was a voluntary convevance and void as against your peti-
tioner. an existing· creditor. 
On February 25, 1943, in a stipulation between the Bank 
and yom· petitioner it was. agreed, among other things, that 
the aforesaid assignment, under which the Bank claimed title 
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to the fund, did not comply with Section 6555-a of the Code 
of Virginia. On March 29, 1943, B. E. Hughes and Dorothy 
Hughes were admitted as parties to the proceeding on their 
petition and at the same time the Bank filed its statement of 
defense to the claim of Minnie E. Knight, which statement 
of defense was ratified and adopted by the said B. E. Hughes 
and his daughter, Dorothy Hughes, as their statement of the 
facts and circumstances attending the assignment by the 
father to the daughter and from her to the Bank. 
Your petitioner then moved the Court to strike out the 
claim of the Bank on the ground that the assignment was 
void, unenforceable and of no effect as against your Peti-
tioner because it did not comply with Section 6555-a of the 
Code and because it was an assignment of unearned salary 
or compensation by a public officer and against public policy. 
This motion was overruled by the Court on the ground that 
the compensation received by the Assignor, as tax assessor, 
was not salary· or wages and if it were, the statute regulating 
assignments was for the benefit of the employer, and if the 
City were an employer in this case, then it was the only 
4·:• one who could complain or *make the defense; the Court 
further held that the assignment was not against public 
policy, and that if the Commonwealth ever had such a policy, 
then it was changed by the sta.tute authorizing garnishment 
of salaries of public officers. 
The Court then prescribed the issue to be submitted in 
this proceeding to a jury for its determination to be '' whether 
there was a valuable consideration for the assignment, dated 
November 27, 1941, made by B. E. Hughes to Dorothy Hughes 
of his compensation as assessor of real estate'' and the Bank, 
B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes were the plaintiffs in said 
issue. Upon the issue joined, and afte.r the introduction of 
all the evidence, before a jury duly summoned to try the is-
sue, the plaintiff, Bank, moved the Court to strike out the 
evidence for your Petitioner on the ground that there was 
no evidence of lack of consideration; that there was no con-
flict in the testimony and nothing for the jury to decide, which 
motion was sustained by the Court over your petitioner's 
objection and exception and the jury was instructed that the 
Court struck out all the evidence offered or elicited on behalf 
of your petitioner and that there was no evidence before it 
except that there was consideration for the assignment. The 
jury retired to its room and thereafter returned a verdict, 
''We the jury find there was no consideration for the assign-· 
ment. H. :ir. Beck, Foreman''. The Bank moved the Court 
to set aside the verdict of the jury because it was contrary 
to the law and the evidence and that there was valuable con-
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sideration for the assignment, which motion was sustained 
and the Court set aside the verdict of the jury and found 
as a matter of law that there was consideration for the as4 
signment and the Court entered judgment on April 26, 1943, 
that The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg recover 
against the defendant, City of Lynchburg, the sum of 
5"" $1,833.36; your petitioner's claim to the fund was 
*thereby denied, and the Court ordered Minnie E. Knight 
to pay the taxable costs of the proceeding· and your petitioner, 
Minnie E. Knight, by counsel, duly objected and excepted 
to the action of the Court in setting aside the verdict of the 
jury, which would have sustained your petitioner's claim, and 
rendering judg·ment for The Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg· v. The City of Lynchburg for the fund involved in these 
proceedings. 
II. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. Your Petitioner assigns as error the action of the Court 
in overruling her motion to strike out of the proceeding the 
claim of The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg to the 
fund on the ground that the assig11ment under which the 
Bank claimed the fund was void, illegal and unenforceable 
because it did not comply with Section 6555-a of the Code of 
Virgfaia, as amended, and because it was an assignment of 
unearned compensation by a public officer and against public 
policy. 
2. Your Petitioner assig·ns as error the action of the Court 
in setting aside the verdict of the jury and rendering· judg-
ment fol' the Bank for the fund, held by the City, because 
there was no consideration deemed valuable in law for the 
assignment as found by the jury verdict and the assig·nment 
was void as a voluntary conveyance as ag·aiust your peti-
tioner, Minnie E. Knight, an existing creditor of the Assignor. 
The assignment also includes the action of the Court in strik-




6* *There are three questions involved in this petition: 
1. ·whether Section 6555-a of the Code of Virginia, as 
amended, applies to an assignment of the compensation of a 
tax assessor of a municipality; and :J 
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2. ·whether an assignment of the unearned compensation 
of a tax assessor is void because against public policy; and 
3. ·whether the relationship of debtor and creditor was 
created between father and daughter, by the delivery of cer-
tain stock certificates from the latter to the former, so as to 
constitute a consideration deemed valuable in law against 
an existing creditor of the father. 
IV. 
THE FACTS. 
During the year 1934 Dorothy Hughes inherited a legaey 
from the estate of her grandfather in which was included 
20 shares of stock in The First National Bank of Lynchburg·, 
6 shares of pref erred stock of J. R. Millner Company, Inc., 
and 9 shares of the preferred stock of the Lynchburg Manu-
f act1;1rers Building, Inc. Sometime during the year 1935 or 
1936· her father, B. E. Hughes, became :financially involved 
and twas called for additional collateral on his loan at The 
Peoples National Bank and for which he went to his daugh-
ter for help. The circumstances surroundin~ the stock trans-
action between father and daughter are decisive of the ques .. 
tion of whether there was a consideration deemed valuable 
in law for the assignment of November 29, 1941, set out here-
inafter, as against your petitioner who was then an existing 
creditor of B. E. Hughes. There were only two witnesses; 
the said B. E. Hughes testified at the instance of the plain-
tiff Bank and his daughter, Dorothy Hug·hes, was called 
7* as an adverse witness by *your petitioner and all of the 
testimony of both of these witnesses relating to the cir-
cumstances at the delivery of the ,stock are set forth in the 
transc.ript of the record at the following pages: 44-47, in-
clusive; 50-55, inclusive; 58, 61,' 62, 81, 82, 85, 89; 92-94, in-
clusive. 
The said B. E. Hug·l1es stated he did not know whether the 
transaction occurred during 1935 or 1936, however, it was 
his recollection that it occurred during 1936 as ]1e borrowed 
the three certificates of stock to use as collateral because his 
assets were "dwindling so fast", and when the Bank called 
. him for additional collateraJ, he went to his daug·hter for 
help in his financial difficulty. The three stock certificates 
were endorsed in blank by his daughter, who did not remem-
ber the year; her signature was witnessed by her father and 
the date of the transaction was left blank on the back of the 
certificates. Dorothy Hughes did not take a note or receipt 
evidencing the delivery of the stock; nor did her father prom-
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ise what he would pay for the stock in the event he failed 
to return it; nor did he say or she ask when the stock would 
be returned, nor did she ask what he wanted with it; nor did 
she lmow its value at the time of the delivery to her father. 
Thereafter Dorothy Hughes endorsed and delivered to her 
father all of the dividend checks which were paid on the three 
stocks from the time she delivered the same to her father 
until the collateral was sold in May, 1939, although no mention 
was ever m1:1de, nor agreement entered into regarding the 
disposition of the dividends on the stock, which in each in-
stance were paid the Bank by Hughes on account of his loan .. 
No mention was made nor agreement had regarding· the pay-
ment of the interest on account of the loan of the stock nor 
on account of the dividends and for all that appears, no state-
ment nor accounting of dividends was ever made, rendered 
or requested. 
It was claimed by Hughes that prior to the stock trans-
s~ action *Dorothy Hughes loaned him a certain sum of 
money for which he gave his three notes, evidencing said 
indebtedness, said notes being in the sum of $1,200.00, $500.00 
and $300.00, and although he was employed as one of the tax 
assessors for the City for the year 1938 and was paid ap-
proximately $2,500.00 in monthly installments, he paid no 
part of this to his daughter, but instead paid ·all of it on ac-
count of his .loan at The Peoples National Bank. In Novem-
ber, 1938, however, just prior to the time your petitioner ob-
tained a judgment against him, B. E. Hug·hes conveyed to 
Dorothy Hughes "five little pieces of property, four at a 
valuation of $370.00", one at a valuation of $190.00, his coun-
try home place, named Cherry Hill Farm, built before 1783,. 
at a valuation of $1,000.00, two mules, some farming equip-
ment and cows, all in payment of the $2,000.00 which he 
claimed was owed her for the three notes mentioned above. 
During the following month and on December 13, 1938, a 
judgn1ent was obtained in the Circuit Court for the City of' 
Lynchburg·, Virginia, in favor of your petitioner against B .. 
E. Hughes in the sum of $2,251.00, with interest from No-
vember 22, 1937, and it was upon an instrument waiving homr-
stead, etc., exemptions, which judgment was docketed in the 
Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court for the City of Lynch-
burg·, on December 15, 1938, in Judgment Lien Docket 18, . 
page 147; an execution was duly issued thereon and placed 
in the l1ands of the sergeant and duly returned "no effects,,,.: 
at the Second April Rules, 1939. · 
On and before May 29, 1939, the financial condition of B. E .. 
Hug·hes became worse and the Bank advised him of the ne-
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cessity to liquidate his collateral securing his loan and. the 
said B. E. Hughes arranged with the Bank that it sell to 
Dorothy Hug·hes the three certificates of stock which he ·had 
borrowed from her and which were still registered in her 
name and appraised by the Bank at $4,500.00 and $2,300.00 
9,., of the collateral registered in the name *of B. E. Hughes 
for her note for that amount plus discount thereon for 
sixty days. Thereupon the said Dorothy Hughes executed 
her note in the sum of $6,845.34 and the collaterals, having 
an appraised value of $6,800.00, were delivered to her and 
hypothecated as collateral on her loan and the loan ~f her 
father was credited by the sum of $6,800.00. 
During the month of October, 1941, the said B. E. Hughes 
was employed as one of the tax assessors for the City, and 
as such he/was allowed certain expenses for the office and 
his salary }was fixed at $2,750.00 for the year 1942, payable 
in twelve equal monthly installments, the first to become due 
and payable on January 31, 1942. At no time had Dorothy 
Hughes made a request for the return of the stock which she 
had delivered to her father, nor did she request any pay-
ment for the value of the same, nor a payment on account 
of the dividends, nor had any payment ever been made to 
her by her father on account of the stock transaction, how-
ever, on November 29, 1941, the said B. E. Hug·hes, without 
any request from his daughter, and without her knowledge 
of the details, assigned to her his unearned salary as tax 
assessor for the year 1942 in the sum of $2,750.00 and the 
said Dorothy Hug·hes on the same day reassigned the same 
to the Bank, said assignments being in the following words 
and figures, to-wit: 
"November 27, 1941. 
"To the Citv of Lynchburg: 
'' For value received I hereby assign and transfer to 
Dorothy Hughes my salary as assessor of real estate for 
the year 1942 amountin~· to $2,750.00 payable in monthly in-
sta11ments beginning- February 1st, 1942, to be applied by 
the. said Dorothy Hughes on account of my indebtedness to 
l1er. 
"Given under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
~'Signed B. E. HUGHES." 
1 Qilt *''I hereby direct the City of Lynchburg to pay the 
montllly inst~llments of the above · assignment to the 
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Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg to be ai)plied by it to 
the payment of my collater~l note held by said Bank. 
"Uiven under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
''Signed DOROTHY HUGHES.'' 
The aaid Dorothy Hughes rem~mbered non~ of the cir-
cums.ta:nces surrounding the assignment and m reply to a 
q1J.~stiQn in regard to the same stated at page 93 of the tran-
script: 
'' A~ don't remember. I have always left all of the details 
of the buaine$S up to my father.'' · 
A11cl at page 92 of the transcript she said : · /\ 
.\ 
'' .A. I don't remember anything at all about a'sking him. 
l remember no q-uestions concerning asking him to pay me. 
I expected him, ta pay me when he was able to do so." (Italics 
ours.) 
The City did not give its consent in writing to either B. E. 
Hughes, Dorothy Hughes nor the Bank for the assig·nment 
which did not complv in any respect with Section 6555-a of 
the Qode of Virginia. In accordance with said assignment, 
the City paid the J a_nuary, 1942, installment to the. Bank by 
check dated Februa1·y 2, 1942, and by check dated May 6, 
1942, paid the February, March and April installments, all 
of which pannents amormted to $916.64. The four monthly 
installments of 19-4:2 salary constituted the only payment by 
Hug·hes to his daug·hter for the stock transaction in 1935 or 
1936, whic.h payments were applied, together with the divi-
dend checks, directly to the payment of the note which 
Dorothy Hug·hes gave the Bank for the c.ollateral which she 
had bought from the Bank and as of the date of the trial 
the ba_lance ~n her !lot~ was $6,568.00. For all that appears, 
there 1s 11,othmg to mdicate that B. E. Hug·hes has ever O'iven 
his daug·hter a note to evidence the stock transaction~ On 
May 13, 1942, your petitioner obtained a renewal of the exe-
cution on her _judgment an~ notfoe thereof was duly served 
on the City and the said B. E. Hug·hes accordino· to the 
11"" statute for such cases and the executions and ll(rlices of 
the *lien thereof have been renewed from time to time 
and your Petitioner has had a subsistino· and valid lien 
against tbe fund due by !he City to B.. E,--Hug·bes from May 
lq, 19.42. After the service of the notice of the lien on Iviay 
15, 1942,. the City refused to make any further payments of 
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salary to B. E. Hughes, ]).orothy Hughes or the Bank and the 
City holds the sum of $1,833.36 as the balance due for services 
rendered by Hughes as tax assessor during the year 1942 
and for which the Bank instituted the suit against the City 




The position of your petitioner may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
(A) That the assig·mnent of November 29, 1941, is not 
valid and enforceable because it fails to comply with Sec-
tion 6555-a of the Code of Virginia as amended and, there-
fore, the lien of the judgment of petitioner attached to the 
fund due by the City to Hughes for failure of the assign-
ment to operate. and transfer the fund to the Bank; 
(B) That the aforesaid assig'llIIlent of the unearned salary 
of a public official is void as against public policy and, there-
fore, the lien of the judgment of petitioner attached to the 
fund due by the City to Hughes for failure of the assignment 
to op_erate and transfer the fund to the Bank; 
(C) That the stock transaction between father and daugh-
ter did not create the relationship of debtor and creditor 
and, therefore, the salary assignment from father to daughter 
five or six years later was without eonsideration and void as 
a voluntary conveyance as against your petitioner, an ex-
isting· creditor. 
Considering the position of the claimant in the order 
12iit enumerated *above, your petitioner says that: 
(A) The Assignment Wa.s Void for Failure to Comply with 
Section 655/,-a of the Code of. Virginia. 
The decision on this assignment of error will be controlled 
by Section 6555-a. of the Code of Virginia ( Acts of the As-
sembly 1940, Chapter 432, page 899), which is in part as fol-
lows: 
''Chap. 432.-An ACT to amend the Code of Virginia by 
adding thereto a new section· numbered 6555-b, prescribing 
the requirements for valid assignments of wages and salaries 
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due or to become due from employers, and making certain 
partial assignments of wages and salaries unenforceable. • "" • 
'' Section 6555-b. No assignment, transfer, pledge or hy-
pothecation of wages or salary due or to become due to any 
pe·rson shall be valid and enforceable against any employer 
of the assignor, except with the express consent in writing 
to creditor or assignee of such employer, unless and until 
all of the following requirements have been fully met: * * • " 
The above statute appears in the Virginia Code of 1942 as 
Section 6555;.a. · 
The City did not give a written consent to the Bank, Hughes 
or to Dorothy Hughes for the assig'llillent nor did the assign-
ment comply, in any respect, to the requirements of the 
statute and, th~refore, the question is put squarely as to 
whether Section 6555-a applies to the facts in this case. 
The statute provides that no ass(qnment of wages or salary 
due or to beconie due shall be vali<l and enforceable agafr1it 
ciny employer of the assignor, except upon conditions which 
admittedly were not met. The words '· no assig'llID.ent'' are 
all inclusive, and without qualification include· the assignment 
in question. The word ''salary'' in the statute is defined and . 
construed to mean compensation of a public of.ficial, and in 
Fidelity Ins., etc., Co. v. 8. V. R. R. Co., 86 Va. (1889), this 
Court said at page 8: 
13~ ., 'Bouvier defines wages to be 'a compensation given 
to a hired person for his or her services' ; and saJary 
he defines as 'a reward or · recompense for services per-
formed, * * * the price of hiring of domestic servants and 
workmen', though the term is usually applied, he says, to 
the rewards paid to a public officer for the' performance or 
his official duties.'' 
Th~ term is also defined in Words and Phrases, Perm. Addi-
tion, Vol. 38, page 38, as follows: 
"Salary is a reward or recompense for services performed. 
The word is usually applied to the reward paid to a- public 
officer for the performance of his official duties. People v .. 
A.dams, 65 Ill. App. 283." 
The provision for reassessment of real estate is contained 
in Section 242 of the Tax Code of Virginia, which provides 
· that the ''compensation'' shall be prescribed by the city 
council and paid by the city treasurer. The term compen-
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sation as there used includes saiary and expenses and au-
thorizes the City to pay the expense of the office which was 
done in this case. The term "salary'' was used by the City 
Council (T. R., pp. 16, 17, 18) in fixing Hughes' salary at 
$2,750.00 for· the year, payable in twelve equal monthly in-
stallments and in allowing expense of the office of $3,000.00. 
In the assignment of November 29, 1941, Hughes referred 
to his compensation as "salary" and that term does not 
mean a thing· that is not included in the term compensation; 
"\V ords and Phrases, Perm. Addition, Vol. 38, page 46. The 
Bank should not be allowed at this time to come in and say 
that the payment for services was not "salary", in order 
to defeat petitioner's claim, when the parties to the trans~ 
action have already so designated it. 
The words any person contained in the statute certainly 
include the tax assessor, B. E. Hughes, the assignor. It is 
submitted that the wording of the statute herein referred to 
is all inclusive, admits of no exception and is clear to 
14~ the point that no construction is required or *permitted 
under the rules for statutory construction heretofore 
laid down by this Court. 
· The Legislature drafted this statute so completely that it 
expressly designates the assignments excepted from the op-
eration of the statute )Vhich are assignments of salary, wages 
and income for the benefit of creditors as provided in Chap-
ter 323 of the Acts of Assembly of 1936. In the same statute 
the Legislature abolished partial assignments, either at law 
or in equity, and de.fined what should not be considered a 
partial assig11111ent under the statute. The Legislature could 
not have employed broader language than it did when it said 
that no assignment of wa.ges or salary of any person shall be 
va.lid and enfor.ceable against the employer. 
The assignment from Hughes to his daughter did not 
comply with the statute and, as a result the Bank did not 
have a valid and enforceable claim against the City and at 
the time the notice of the lien of the execution of your peti-
tioner was served on the City, the City was still indebted 
to B. E. Hng·hes, the assignment having no force and effect 
to transfer the fund and, therefore, the lien of the judgment 
of petitioner attached to the fund. 
The questions Qf whether the City waived the requirem~nts 
of the statute or whether the defense of the statute could be 
asserted only by the City have no proper place in the decision 
of this matter for the reason that the assignment. did not 
comply with the statute and the same was by operation of 
law invalid and unenforceable. That being the case, an in-
,·alid assignment could not transfer the ownership of the 
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salary of Hughes to the Bank and the City remained in-
debted to Hug·hes and was so indebted when the lien of the 
judgment of petitioner attached to the fund. A holding to 
the contrary would iu effect permit the Bank to obt.ain the 
fund under an instrument which the law· declares in-
15(11 valid and unenforceable, thereby nullifying au ex-
pressed *declaration of the Legislature. 
(B) The Assignment of Unearned Salary Is Void Because 
.c(qainst P1ibl-ic Policy. 
On November 29, 1941, B. E. Hughes assigned to Dorothy 
Hughes his salary as tax assessor for the year 1942 which was 
to be earned in the future ( T. R., pp. 16, 17, 18, 22 and . 52), 
by his services to be performed according to Section 244 of 
the Tax Code of Virginia. It is the majority rule in this 
country, practically to the point of being universal, as well 
as in mngland, that an assignment of the unearned compen-
sation of a public official is void as against public policy be-
cause by so doing '' a public officer strips himself of further 
inducement to perform his services and thus chills his ef-
forts". We find no case_ in which this Court has passed on 
this point, however, in Steven-son v. Kyle, 24 S. E. 886 (W. 
Va., 1896), a tax assessor gave an assignment in payment 
of the purchase price of a horse and in ·a suit by the assignee 
to recover the amount of the assignment the Court stated that 
the compensation of a public officer is not assignable. At 
page 887 the Court said: 
''Needy officers, under present pressure, would assign 
their future pay, and then neglect the public service. They 
would assign away the bread from their mouths. So that the 
behests of the public service and of the officers both concur 
in branding assignments of compensation for future service 
as contrary to public policy, as detracting from efficiency. 
And is the government of the county court or other sub-
agency of the state government to be embroiled in conflict-
ing claims to salary or compensation f Where would its com-
plications end f If such an assignment is tolerated, we must 
· tolerate it for fractions, and compel the county treasurer to 
pay 1mrt to one, parts to others. Of course this would never 
do. Public policy and the orderly dispat<ah. of public busi-
ness would for bid this.'' 
In Fischer v. Liberty National Bank·· <t Tm.st C01n-
16* pany in Ne·w York, 61 Fed. •(2nd) 757 -(C. C. A., 2nd 
Cir., 1932), the Court in dealing· with an assignment 
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of future compensation of a court receiver stated in an opin-
ion by Learned Hand, Circuit Judge, at page 758: 
"It is settled both in England and in this country that the 
assignment of the future compensation of a public officer ,is 
not valid~'' . 
This subject has also been dealt with in Restatement of 
Contracts, Vol. I, Section 151, Illustration 7 to Comment b 
and in Vol. II of the same work at Section 547, page 1050, 
the following appears : 
'' (1) An assig·nment of a claim against a third person or 
bargain to assig-n · such a claim is illegal and ineffective if 
the claim is for 
'' (a) The salary or pay, not yet due, of a public officer or 
employee, or llfl :fi, * '' 
and in the same woi·k at page 1051 comment on sub-section 
(1) c: · 
"The limitation on the power of assigning salary or the 
pay of a public officer is more strict and unless the money 
is actually due an, assignment can not be effectively made.'' 
In Buyers, et al., v. Comer, 68 P. 2nd 671 (Arizona, 1937), 
the judgment debtor was chairman of the board of super-
vi~ors of the county who had assigned unearned official 
salary. His judgment creditor sued out a writ of garnish-
ment against the county for his salary to which proceeding 
the bank, the 8:Ssignee, intervened and claimed the salary 
under its assignment.. Judgment was rendered in favor of 
the garnishment creditor of the county official and against 
the assig'llee bank and the Court there said in quoting· from 
an Oregon case the following at page 672: 
"A clear preponderance of authority is that an assign-
ment of future compensation not yet earned, whether pay-
able by salary or fees, is opposed to public policy and void . 
. A contrary rule would permit the public service to be under-
mined by the assignment to strang·ers of the fund \lliap-
17* propriated to salaries. If such assignments are per-
mitted, the officer in the performance · of his duties, 
would no doubt be in the position of one as per common par-
lance, ~paying for a dead horse'." 
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;rhe .general rule that a public officer can not assign un.... · 
earned compensation is not changed by statute authorizing 
the garnishment of the compensation of such officer unless 
the statute expressly so provides. Buyers v. Comer, supra; 
Tribune Reporter Prittting Comvany v. Homer, 169 Pac. 170 
(Utah, 1917); 6 C. J. Secundum, .Sec. 21, p. 1069. 
In Tribmie Reporter Prvnting Company v. Comer, supra, 
the assignor was a county clerk who had assigned his un-· 
earned salary.. The plaintiff procured a judgment against 
the county clerk and thereafter garnisheed his salary to 
which the county replied that the defendant had assigned his 
salary prior to the date of the judgment. The Court held for 
the garnishing creditor on the ground that the assignment 
of the Clerk's unearned compensation was void as against 
public policy. To the contention that the public policy had 
been changed by a statute permitting garnishment of the 
compensation of an officer the Court said at page 171: 
'' If we were a legislative body dealing with this question 
as a subject of legislature we might be in a better position 
to appreciate the logic of appellant's contention. But the 
function of this court being solely to declare what the law 
is, and not .what the court thinks it ought to be, it is readily 
seen that our duties restrict us to a narrower field of thought 
and investigation. The question naturally arises: Did the 
Legislature, by changing the g·eneral law relating to garnish-
ment, etc., of the compensation of public officers, as declared 
by the great weight of judicial authority, likewise intend to 
change the law relating to assignments of such compensation 
before the same became due and payable f If it did, why 
did it not so declare? What reason have we to believe the 
Legislature so intended Y Is it not more reasonable to pre-
sume that, having the general la.w before it relating to both 
garnishments and assignments, the Legislature deliberately 
intended to change the law as to the one, and to leave 
18* *the other as it existed before T The express mention 
of one thing implies the exclusion of another. While 
this may not be a typical illustration of the maxim, 'Expressia 
'ltnius est ea;clusio alterfos 7, it nevertheless falls within its 
principle.'' 
and in the same case at page 172 the same Court said: 
'' The Legislature mav have been influenced by conditions 
existing at the time, and considered it prudent policy to pro-
tect creditors against the improvidence and indifference of 
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such public officers as mig·ht seek to take advantage of their 
position, and thus avoid the payment of their debts, or it 
may have intended, by subjecting the compensation of a pub-
lic officer, when due, to garnishment or attachment proceed-
ings, to thereby place the creditor in a position at least as 
aavantageous as that of other persons to whom the officer 
might assign or pay his compensation when due; for it is 
not within the contemplation of this opinion that, even under 
the law as it now stands, a public officer may not assig·n his 
compensation, if he chooses, whenever the same bas been 
earned and hecomes payable. Whatever may have been the 
reasons prompting the Legislature to make the distinction 
it did make, it is sufficient to say it made the distinction, 
and, having made it, it is impossible for us to draw a con-
clusion favora~le to appellant.s' contention.'' 
Our st~tute, Sec. 6560 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, 
changing the common law and authorizing garnishment and 
execution upon any judg·ment against the wages and salaries 
of all officials, clerks, and employees of a city, does not in-
clude assig·nment nor is there any other statute authorizing· 
the same by a pub1ic of.fleer. The statute is in derogation 
of the common law in legalizing the garnishment of the com-
pensation of public of.fleer and must be strictly construed,: 
however, no construction is necessary or permitted when the 
statute is clear. The Legislature saw .fit to omit assig11ments 
and the law remains as written by the Legislature until it 
sees fit to alter it. As in the case of Omahitndro v. Palmer, 
158 Va. 693, this court said, in quoting from Virginia Devel-
opment Company v. Rich Patch Iron Company, 98 Va. 709, 
at page 698: 
19* •:'The course of procedure is established by law, and 
it is our duty to see that it is observed, until the Leg-
islature in its wisdom shall see .:fit to change that course of 
procedure by statute. It is not a question of expediency. 
It is a question of power * * • . " 
The assignment of Hughes to his daughter being void could 
not operate to transfer the title to the salary from Hughes 
toJ the Bank and, therefore, the City was still indebted to 
Hug·hes and the lien of the judgment of Petitioner attached 
to the fund when notice of the lien of the execution was duly 
served and your Petitioner thereupon became entitled to th~ 
fund. 
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(C) The Assignment Is Void Because Voluntary As to Peti~ 
tioner an Exis/.ing Creditor. 
This assignment of error is controlled by Section 5185 of 
the Code of Virginia as amended, the pertinent part of which 
is as follows: 
'' Section 5185. Gifts, conveyances, etc., that are voluntary, 
or upon consideration of marriage, void as to prior creditors. 
-Every gift, conveyance, assig-nment, * * * which is not upon 
consideration deemed valuable in law, * * · * shall be void as 
to creditors whose debts shall have been contracted at the 
time. it was made, * * * . '' 
The issue submitted to the jury, therefore, was whether 
there was a valid consideration for the assignment of No-
vember 29, 1941, since there was no question that Petitioner 
was an existing- creditor of B. E. Hughes, the assignor. The 
plaintiffs, the Hug·heses and the Bank, relied upon an alleged 
past indebtedness claimed to have arisen out of the delivery 
of the stock certificates to the father by the daughter as con-
sideration for the assig·nment five or six years later in al-
leg·ed payment for the stock. In Glascock v. Oommissione'r 
of Internal Revenue, 104 Fed. (2~d) 475 (C. C. A., 4th Uir., 
1939), the question, involving a tax deduction, was 
20* whether certain transactions between a mother and $her 
children were legal and enforceable by the children and 
there the Court said through Judge Northcutt, at page 477: 
'' The rule in Virginia, with few exceptions, is that a past 
consideration which imposed no legal obligation at the time 
it arose will support no promise whatever. Davis v . .Ander-
son, 99 Va. 620, 39 S. E. 588; Stoneburner and Richards v. 
lJ!I otley, 95 Va. 784, 30 S. · E. 364. '' 
The question then is whether the delivery of the stock to 
the father by the daug·hter at the time created a leg·al liability 
giving rise to a debt as the consideration for the assign-
ment. 
No leg·al obligation arose out of the stock transaction by 
operation of law, so as to create an implied contract to r~-
pay, as the relationship of the .parties is such that the law 
presumes such a transaction to constitute a gift unless there 
was an express contract between the parties at the time of 
the transaction. In Throckmorton v. .Thmckmorton, 91 Va. 
42 (1895), a divorced wife sued to recover certain property 
from her former husband, and the Court said at page 48: 
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''Under these circumstances, the law does not imply a 
promise of repayment, as would be the case if they were 
strang·ers, but presumes that the receipt and use. of her moneys 
and her property, or its proceeds, was a gift of them by 
her to her husband and not a loan. Beecher v. Wilson, Burns 
& Co., 84 Va. 813 • «< * ." 
The testimony of the parties of the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction and their subsequent actions fall 
far short of establishing the bona -fides of the relation of 
debtor and creditor, and on the contrary., shows that the 
parties at the time had no present · intention. of becoming 
debtor 'and creditor. When B. E. Hughes, the father, was 
cross examined regarding the circumstances at the time of 
the transaction, the following appears at page 82 of the 
transcript of the record: 
"Q. In other words, she just handed you the stock and 
you said, 'Thank you, I will get it back to you or pay you for 
it' 1" 
21 * *'' A. I didn't say anything of the kind. I asked her 
to loan me the stock arid handed her the certificates and 
she signed them. I expected to return them to her and I 
considered my assets ample at the time to do it.'' 
'· Q. You said, 'Here are the stock certificates., you endorse 
them and loan them to me'Y" 
'' A. 'Loan me this stook.' And if I hadn't expected to re-
turn it or pay for it, I wouldn't have borrowed it.'' 
When Dorothy Hughes was cross examined, the following 
appears at pag·e 89: · 
''Q. Did you take any note or any receipt from your father 
at the time you gave him these collaterals or stocks?" 
'' A. No, I did not. When he asked me he said, 'I want to 
borrow some of your stock'. He said that he needed some 
of them and I told him that I would lend them to him. He 
said he wanted to borrow them for awhile and would return· 
them and I expected the stock to be returned.'' 
This was the transaction relied upon as consideration deemed 
valuable in law and creating the relationship of debtor 
and creditor to base the assignment made five or six years 
later. In Beecher, et al., v. Wilson, Burns ~ Co., 84 Va. 813 
(1888), creditors of the husband set aside a_s fr~udule~t a 
deed of settlement to the wife and at pag-e 818 said: = · ·. · 1 
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. "The .si.Jnp,e fact thi~.t the husband used the wife's money, 
as alleged; is not a sufficient consideration to support the 
deed of settlement in the absence of proof that, at the time 
and times the various sums of money were received from 
the wife, it was understood to be loaned; and that, then and 
subsequently, both husband and wife recog·nized it as a debt, 
and intended to stand to each other in the relation of debtor 
and creditor.'' 
At the time of the delivery of the stock, which was vague, 
indefinite and uncertain no note or receipt was offered or 
demanded; no promise was given nor. requested as to when 
the stock would be returned; no mention or agreement was 
had reg·arding dividends. Dorothy Hughes, the daughter, 
didn't know the value of the stock, nor did she ask the pur-
pose for which it was being borrowed. No interest was 
charged nor account rendered between the parties for the 
indebtedness. ...1\.11 dividend checks were endorsed and 
22* delivered to *the father and no request was ever made 
for a payment therefor, nor on account thereof, aud 
for all that appears, none was ever expected by Dorothy 
Hughes. In Brunswick Bank v. Valentfrie, 158Va. 512 (1932), 
this Court, in its opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, said 
at page 520: 
"There is not a corroborative fact or circumstance ap-
pearing in the record that the original transaction repre-
sented a loan by the wife to the husband, or that there was a 
contemporaneous promise on his part to pay the debt, * • * 
and the mere parol testimony of the insolvent husband that 
the transaction was intended as a loan will not, as against 
creditors, rebut the presumption of a gift." 
The total lack of the elements of an ordinary business trans-
action in the delivery of the stock becomes more important 
when a prior transaction between the parties is consid-
ered. At that time the father gave his daughter three note~ 
one for $1,200.00, one for $500~00 and one for $300.00, evi-
dencing· money advanced him prior to the stock delivery 
and, of course, prior to 1935 or 1936, the times given by the 
parties for the stock delivery. Hughes claimed that he re-
paid his daug·hter for the "loan of the money" and this pay-
ment was made just prior to the date of petitioner's judg-
ment by conveying the real estate, farming equiprµent and 
livestock mentioned hereinbef'ore, thoug·h prior to that time 
he had not paid one penny, nor had his daughter ever re-
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quested payment, though he received approximately the same 
salary as tax assessor in the year 1938 as he did in 1942. 
That transaction was evidenced by not~s and payment was 
made on account of the same by the debtor divesting him-
self of all of his assets from all that appears from the rec-
ord. No payment was ever made or requested on account 
of the stock transaction and it would seem that an apparent 
reason for this failure was given by Dorothy Hughes at (T. 
R., p. 92) where she said: "I expected him to pay when 
23* he was able to do so." In the case *of Hanes v. Bunt-
ing, 152 Va. 395, the Court in speaking through Mr. 
Chief Justice Campbell, said at page 401: 
'' While it is true that the relationship of mother and son 
does not of itself constitute fraud, yet a transaction between 
parties so closely bound together, where the rights of third 
parties are involved, calls for the closest investigation.'' 
Dorothy Hughes never requested the assignment of No-
vember 29, 1941, nor did she remember the year in which it 
was given (T. R., p. 91) nor did the assignment itself set 
forth the consideration for the same. She took no written 
obligation to st.ay the running of the statute of limitations 
and the claim was barred by the statute at the time she re-
ceived the assignment. No circumstances or group of cir-
cumstances could give a more complete picture of the lack 
of the relation of debtor and creditor. The testimony of 
the parties themselves fails to show an unequivocal contem-
poraneous promise by the father and a reliance by the 
daughter on the same. In this case the burden is upon the 
assignor to prove the consideration for the assignment which 
had for its purpose the transfer of the fund to the Bank for 
the account of the daughter, however, we submit that peti-
tioner has carried tbe burden in this case by establishing 
the lack of consideration. In the case of Fowlkes v. Tucker, 
164 Va. 507. this Court said in quoting from Parr v. Saun-
ders, 1 Va. Dec. 731, at page 515: 
'' A transaction may of itself and by itself furnish the most 
satisfactory proof of fraud so conclusive as to outweigh the 
answers of tl1e defendant and even the testimony of wit-
nesses.'' 
The hurden in this case is on the father and daughter, 
11laintiffs, to show that the original transaction represented 
n loan by her to her father and that he made a contempo-
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raneous promise to pay the loan, for otherwise what was 
originally a gift to her father, could subsequently, when 
24* he •became mvolved, be converted into a debt to his 
daughter and thus remove his property from the reach 
of his creditors. National Valley .dank v. Roudabush, 170 
Va. 528 (1938); Fowlkes v. Tucker, supra; Brwnswick Ba;nk 
v. Valentine, supra; Davis v. Southern Distributing Oom-
pooy, 148 Va. 779 (1927). 
In Fowlkes v. Tucker, supra, the Court held a conveyance 
from a husband to the wife in payment of certain notes held 
by the wife to be void and speaking through Mr. Justice Eg-
gleston said at page 512: 
'' While both she and her husband testified that the deed 
was g·iven to secure money actually loaned by the wife to the 
husband, no part of which had been repaid, no vouchers, 
checks or evidence of payment other than the notes them-
selves were produced.'' 
In the case of National Valley Bank v. Roudabush, 170 Va. 
528, the creditor filed a bill alleging· a voluntary conveyance 
from a mother and father to their children and on an appeal 
by the creditor from the holding of the trial court that the 
deed was valid, it appears that the mother contended that 
the conveyance was in discharge of an alleged pre-existing 
indebtedness from her to her sister and two children. This 
Court reversed the trial court and held that the deed was 
voluntary as to the bank, an existing creditor at the time of 
the conveyance. The grantor depended upon the oral testi-
mony of members of the family to prove that the obligations 
asserted ag·ainst the mother, at their inception, were based 
on promises to repay, however, they did not ask for any note 
or bond or other written obligation for the debt nor were 
any letters retained to evidence the debt and thoug·h the items 
extended over twenty-three years, in one case, yet there was 
no demand for payment of interest or settlement until it was 
apparent that the gTantor was in failing :financial circum-
stances and the Court, in speaking through Mr. Justice 
Hudgins, said at page 536 : 
25* *"It seems incredible that a creditor should advance, 
even to a member of 4is own family, the sum of $2,975, 
make no entry of the time or the amount of advances, retain 
no letters asking for a loan of the money, or cancelled checks 
showing- that the money was actually paid, and permit an 
open account in this unsettled state to continue for nearly a 
M. JiJ. Kaj.ghtyv:~ ·.feQpler:L~~-t. -Bk ... of Lynchburg) et al. 21 
quarter of a century without . reques;t · for a settlement or- a 
payment of interest. A conveyance in ·consideration of sooh 
stale demands by a debtor who is insolvent or in failing cir-
cumstances, is strong evidence of an intent to hinder, delay 
or defraud creditors.'' 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from Parksley 
National Bank v. Parks, 172 Va. 169, which was instituted 
by the creditor bank to set aside a deed of trust from a hus-
band to his wife as fraudulent. The cause was heard by com-
missioner in chancery who found that the conveyance was 
for a valid consideration, and this was affirmed by the trial 
court and upheld by this Court. There the wife had in-
herited property from her father and from time to time made 
various loans to her husband, some of which consisted of 
stocks and bonds which he used as collateral. His wife pro-
duced a private record in which she claimed to have marked 
down the times of the delivery and value of the stocks; de-
posits of the husband at the bank corresponded with_ the 
amounts shown by the stock brokers to have been obtained 
for the sale of the stock; and each time the husband gave 
her a note for the market value of the stocks and bonds de-
livered to him. Each testified that there was an unequivocal 
agreement that the amount represented· by the securities 
were actual Joans; notes were kept by the wife and she kept 
a hook showing- the amount of dividends due on the stock and 
the value and disposition of the same. The wife did not 
claim interest on the entire debt, but she did on that part 
of the same which represented some income to her husband; 
the husband had other property left for his creditors. The 
dealings between the parties in this case were corroborated 
by documentary evidence and there was something to sub-
stantiate the oral testimony of the parties and their 
26* version *of the case was accepted· by the commissioner 
and the court below. 
In this case there is no single fact to indicate the relation 
of debtor and creditor between father and daughter, except 
the vague, indefinite and equivocal statement of the parties, 
as to a promise to return the stock and under the circum-
stances the most pertinent statement that can be made in 
connection herewith was made by this Court in its opinion 
in the case of National Valley Bank v. Roudabush, supra, at 
page 535: 
'' The difficulty we have in_ accepting this, and other oral 
testimony of members of the family, is the total lack of 
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writte;n"' or docum~ntary evidence or other corroborating cir-
cumstances tending to show that at the time the money was 
3:dvanced, it was the intention of the parties to create the re-
lation of creditor and debtor.'' 
It must be remembered that this petitioner comes to this 
Court with a jury's verdict which said expressly that there 
was no consideration for the assignment. The jury, who 
heard the testimony, saw the witnesses, father and daughter 
only, and observed their demeanor while testifying, rendered 
a verdict in accordance ·with your petitioner's contention .. 
The court thought otherwise, however, and set aside the ver-
dict and entered ju~<rynent accordingly. Here we have the 
jury's verdict set aside by the trial court and we come before 
this Court in a more favorable light than the creditor in the 
case of National Valley Bank v. Roudabush, su.pra, in which 
the trial court upon issue submitted to it held the deed valid,. 
which holding wtts reversed by this Court. In that case the 
attacking creditor had the burden of proof, whereas in this 
case the burden was on the assignor and his assignees. 
It is submitted that the assignor and his assignees have 
failed to carry the burden of proving a pre-existing indebt-
edness between the father and the daug·hter as consideration 
for the assignment five or six years later and that since no 
legal liability was established between father and daughter 
at the time of the delivery of the stock, the assignment 
27* of November 29, 1941, •is void as to your petitioner, an 
existing creditor, for the reason that it was without 
consideration. The jury's verdict, therefore, should be re-
instated by this Court and a judgment entered by this Court 
in favor of your petitioner v. the City of Lynchburg for the 
fund now held by the City. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the assignment 
from B. E. Hughes to Dorothy Hughes, bearing date of No-
vember 29, 1941, is void as to your petitioner on iile gTound 
that the same does not comply with Section 6555-a of the 
Code of Vir~:inia, as amended; because it constitutes an as-
signment of the future compensation of a public official; and 
because the same is voluntary and without consideration as 
to your petitioner, an existii1£?.· creditor. It follows, there-
fore, tl1e assignment being void, that it had no force ancI 
effect to transfer the title. to the fund1 due B .. E. Hughes 
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by the City, from Hughes to the Bank and the lien of the 
judgment of petitioner attached to the fund when the notice 
of the lien of her execution was duly served. Your petitioner, 
the ref ore, prays that a writ of error and supersedeas be 
granted her and that the :final judgment of the Corporation 
Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, be reviewed, re-
versed and set aside and final judgment entered by this Court 
in favor of your petitioner against the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, for the sum of $1,833.36. 
Counsel for petitioner desires to state orally the reason 
why the :final judgment complained of should be reviewerl: and 
in the event a writ of error is granted, counsel will adopt 
this peti~ion as the opening brief for the plaintiff in 
error. 
28* * A copy of this petition, pursuant to the rules of 
this Court, was mailed on· June 23, 1943, to James R. 
Caskie, attorney for The Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg, s: G. Hamner, attorney for B. E. Hughes and Dorothy 
Hug·hes and Robert D. Morrison, attorney for the City of 
Lynchburg, they being the attorneys for those parties in the 
trial court. 
This petition, together with a transcript of the record of 
this case, duly certified by the Clerk of the Corporation Court 
for the City of Lynchburg·, Virginia, will be :filed in the office 
of M. B. Watts, Clerk," Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, at Richmond, Virginia, to be by him delivered to a 
J ustfoe of the Court. 
Of Counsel: 
Respectfully submitted, 
MINNIE E. KNIGHT, 
By WM. ROSENBERGER, JR., 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
PERROW & ROSEN·BERGE.R. 
Lynchburg, Virginia, June 23, 1943. 
The undersigned, Wm. Rosenberger, Jr., an attorney duly 
qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, whose address is 407 Krise Building, Lynchburg, 
Virginia, does hereby certify that in his opinion the :final judg-
ment of the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, in the case of The Peoples National Bank ·of Lynch-
burg and B. E. Hughes.and Dorothy Hughes v. City of Lynch-
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burg and Minnie E. Knight, ought to be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
WM. ROSENBERGER, JR. 
Received June 24, 1943. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error and supersedeas granted. 7/16/43. Bond 
$300.00. 
H. B. G. 
Received July 17, 1943. 




Pleas before the Honorable S. Du Val Martin, Judge of 
the corporation court for the city of Lynchburg, at the 
courthouse thereof, on the 26th day of April, A. D., 1943, 
and in the 167th year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 19th day 
of January, 1943, 'the Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg 
by Mess. Caskie, Frost and Watts, its attorneys, caused to 
be returned to and filed in the clerk's office of the corpora-
tion court for the city of Lynchburg, its notice of motion for 
judgment for money against the City of Lynchburg, which 
said notice had been duly served upon the defendant, and 
was returnable to said court February 8th, 1943, and is in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
NOTICE. 
To the City of Lynchburg. 
Take Notice: 
That on Monday, February 8, 1948, that being a day of the 
February Term of the Corporation Court for the City of 
Lynchburg·, Virginia, at 10 :00 o'clock A. M., or as soon there-
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after as the matter can be heard, the undersigned will move 
the said Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg for a 
judgment ag·ainst you in the sum of Eighteen Hundred 
Thirty-three and 36/100 Dollars ($1,833.36), being the bal-
ance due by you on the contract with B. E. Hughes as your 
assessor of real estate, and which said amount was duly as-
signed by the said B. E. Hughes to Dorothy Hughes, by as-
signment dated N oyember 29, 1941, and reassigned and di-
rected to be paid to the undersigned by the said Dorothy 
Hughes on the 29th day of November, 1941, and of 
page 2 }- which assignment you had due and proper notice. 
Respectfully, 
THE PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK OF 
LYNCHBURG, 
By Counsel. 
CASIGE, FROST & WATTS, p. q. 
At which day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
February 8th, 1943: 
This day came· the defendant by its Attorney, and it ap-
pearing· from the affidavit of the defendant that it claims 
no interest in $1,833.36, the subject matter of this action, but 
that Minnie E. Knight has a claim thereto, and that the said 
defendant does not collude with the said Minnie E. Knight, 
but is ready to pay or dispose of the $1,833.36 as the Court 
may direct; it is therefore. ordered that the said Minnie E. 
Knight do appear before this Court on the 18th day of Feb-
ruary, 1943, a.nd state the nature of her claim, and maintain 
or relinquish it; in the meantime the proceedings herein shall 
be stayed. 
The Affidavit referred to in the foregoing order is in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
AFFIDAVIT. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Lynchburg, To-wit: 
i> ' 
This day, in the City of Lynchburg, R. S. Harris person-
ally appeared before me, Thelma Lee Hicks, a Notary Public 
in and for the City aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, and 
made oath that he is the Auditor and agent for the defend-
ant in the above entitled action; that the City claims no in-
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terest in the subject matter of the action, which is a balance 
of $1,833.36 due ·by the defendant on a contract 
page 3 ~ with B. E. Hugp.es as assessor of real estate; but 
• · that a third party, namely, Minnie E. Knight, has 
.asserted a claim thereto and has served the defendant with 
certain notices of executions on a judgment in her favor 
against the said B. }]. Hughes; that the defendant does not 
collude with the said Minnie E. Knight, but is ready to pay 
or dispose of the said $1,833.36 as the Court may direct; and 
that, in accordance with Section 6151 of the Code of Virginia, 
the defendant requests that the Court enter an order requir-
ing the said Minnie E. Knight to appear before this Court 
and state the nature of her claim and maintain or relinquish 
it, and in the meantime staying the proceedings in this ac-
tion. 
R. K HARRIS, 
Auditor and Agent for the City of 
Lynchburg. · 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of Feb-
ruary, 1943. 
My commission expires the 27th day of· June, 1946. 
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand the 
day, month, and year aforesaid~ 
THELMA LEE HICKS, 
· Notary Public. 
SUMMONS. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia 
To the Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg, Greeting: 
Whereas, in the notice of motion for judgment proceeding 
pending in the corporation court for the city of Lynchburg, 
Virginia, under the style of Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg v. City of Lynchburg, the defendant therein has filed 
an affidavit that it claims no interest in $1,833.36, the subject 
matter of said proceeding, but that Minnie E. Knight has a 
claim thereto, and that the said def enda.nt does not 
page 4 ~ collude with the said Minnie E. Knight, but is ready 
to pay or dispose of the $1,833.36 as the court may 
ill~;~ . . 
M. E. Km~t-.v .. Peoples ~_!it. Bk. of Lynchb11:rg, et al. 27. 
, Whereas, the said court by .order entered February 8th~ 
1943; hav.ing qr.der~<;l that Minnie E. Knight .. do appear be-
fore said court on the 18th day of February, 1943, and state 
the. nature. of her cla~, and maintain or relinquish it; and 
in the meantim.e .the proceedi.J;igs herein shall be staye~: 
. Now,, therefore, we command you that you summon the 
said Minnie E. Knight to appear before th~ corporation 
court for the city of Lynchburg, at the courtho~se thereof, 
0,n the 18th day of February, 1943, and state the nature of 
her claim to the $1,833.36 aforesaid, and maintain or~ re-
linquish the same, accPrding to law; and have then there this 
w~~t. 
. . .. 
Witness, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of said court, this the 
8th day of ],ebruary, 1943, and in the 167th year of the Com-
m.onwealth. . . . 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
Legal and timely service of the above summons is hereby 
accepted and acknowledged: 
MINNIE E. KNIGHT, 
by PE·RROW & ROSENBERGER, 
Her Attorneys. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
February 18th, 1943 . 
. This day came Minnie E. Knight, petitioner, by counsel, 
and presented her petition to the Court and prayed to be 
made a party defendant in this proceeding. 
: Upon Consideration whereof, it appearing proper so to do, 
it is ordered that the said petitioner, Minnie E. Knight, be 
made a party defendant in the cause of action of 
page 5 ~ the·Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg v. City of 
. . Lynchburg; it is further ordered that the said pe-
tition be filed in the papers in the aforesaid proceeding and 
that same be treated as·a statement of the nature of the claim 
of said Minnie E. Knight. 
. The Petition of Minnie E. Knight referred to in the fore-
going order is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
28 . · ~ · Supreme _Court ·of .Appeals_ of Virgiuin 
To the Honorable S. DuVaLMartin, Judge of th~ Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
The undersigned Minnie E. Knight, petitioner, would show· 
unto your Honor the following state of facts: 
(1) That there is now pending in your Honor's Court a 
notice of motion for judgment in which the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg· is the plaintiff and the City of Lynch-· 
burg· is the defendant. The defendant, the City of Lynch-
burg, by R. S. Harris, its auditor and agent, :b.led an affi-
davit, pursuant to Section 6151 of the Code of Virginia, as 
amended, in the aforesaid· action or proceeding brought 
against it by the Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, 
wherein the aforesaid City states that it claims no interest 
in the subject matter of the proceeding, which is a balance 
of $1,833.~6 due by it on a contract with B. E. Hughes as 
an assessor of real estate, but that Minnie E. Knight, your 
petitioner, ·has a claim thereto and that the defendant does 
not collude with Minnie E. Knight, and pursuant to the afore-
said affidavit, all of the prerequisites being set forth, and pur-
suant to Section 6151 of the Code of Virginia, this Honorable 
· Court ordered Minnie E. Knight, your petitioner, to appear 
before it on this the 18th day of February, 1943, and state 
the nature of her claim and maintain or relinquish it and pur-
suant thereto and in order to establish her claim 
page 6 r to the aforesaid fund, your petitioner, Minnie E. 
Knight, :files this her petition in the aforesaid pro-
ceedings instituted by the Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg; and the proceedings in the original action brought by 
the Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg against the City of 
Lynchburg were stayed by virtue of the aforesaid order en-
tered by your Honor's Court on February 8, 1943; 
(2) That it is stated in the notice of motion for judgment 
brought by the Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg· v. the 
City of Lynchburg and returnable to your Honor's Court 
on February 8, 1943, that the aforesaid Bank would move 
your Honor's Court for judgment against the City of Lynch-
burg in the sum of $1,833.36 and it was · alleged in the afore-
said notice that that balance was due by the City of Lynch-
burg on a contract with B. E. Hughes as an assessor of real 
estate, and it was further alleged by the aforesaid Bank that 
the afore said amount was duly assig11ed by the said B. E. 
Hughes to Dorothy Hughes by assignment dated Novemher 
29, 1941, and· on the same date by the said Dorothy Hughes 
reassig·ned and directed to be paid to the afore said Bank and 
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that the City had due and proper notice of the aforesaid a1:s-
signment; 
( 3) Your petitioner alleges and charges that the aforesaid 
assignment, bearing date of November 29, 1941, and under 
which the aforesaid Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg 
claims the afore said S)lm of $1,833.36, is void, unenforceable 
and of no effect. TM aforesaid assignment of the wages or 
salary of the said B. E. Hughes and the aforesaid assign-
ment from the said Dorothy Hughes to the said Peoples Na-
tional Bank of Lynchburg are in the following words and 
.figures, to-wit: 
''November 27, 1941. 
To the City of Lynchburg: 
· · For value ·received I hereby assign and transfer 
page 7 ~ to Dorothy Hughes my salary as assessor of real 
estate for the year 1942 amounting to $2,750.00 pay-
able in monthly installments beginning· February 1st, 1942, 
to be applied by the said Dorothy Hughes on account of my 
indebtedness to her. · 
Give~ under my ha~d this 29th day of November, 1941. 
Signed B. E. HUGHES.'' 
· "I hereby direct the City of Lynchburg to pay the monthly 
installments of the above assignment to the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg to be applied by it to the payment of my 
collateral note held by said Bank. 
· ·Given under :iny hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
Signe~ DOROTHY HUGHES." 
( 4) Your petitioner further alleges and charges that the 
aforesaid words and figures contained in the aforesaid writ-
ing made by B. E. Hughes on November 29, 1941, constituted 
an assig'llment by B. E. Hughes of wages or salary due or to 
become due. to him by his employer, the City of Lynchburg, 
and that neither B. E. Hughes nor Dorothy Hughes, nor the 
Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg had the expressed con-
sent in writing of the City of Lynchburg for such assign-
ment; and your petitioner further alleges and charges that 
the said assig'llment was not printed and was in a type smaller 
than pica and it was not plainly desig'llated "Wage .Assign-
ment''; that such assignment was not executed in triplicate; 
that the assignor, B. E. Hughes, was not employed by the 
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City of ~ynchburg at. the ·t~e •. o.f _tp.e execution ~f ~e afo.re"7 
said assignment; that the notice of the assignor's mtention 
to e~fot~e thQ terms of th:e _a.s~ignment was not served on 
the City of Lynchburg by_~. officer or other person author-. 
ized to serve civil proc_ess ;. nor have the other requirements 
enumerated in. and provided by Section 6555a of 
page 8 ~ the Code of Virginia, as amended, been fully met~ 
.,' Your petitioner further alleges and charges that 
the aforesaid assignment of wages or salary of B. E. Hughes, 
bearing date of ~ovembe.r _29, 1941, is invalid and unenforce-: 
able as it fails to meet the requirements of an enforce3:ble as-
sigmnent of wages or salary; 
( 5) Tp.at o~ ~~ J.::l:tl! .d.~y of August, 1941, your petitioner 
was paid the sum of $435.71 by the said B. E. Hughes, which 
amount was credited against the.: amount due.· by the judg-
ment mentioned hereinafter; 
. ( 6) Your_-;petitio:p.er- Jur.ther alleges and charges that at · 
the December_ ~ern,., 193~, of the. Circuit Court for ~he City 
of Lynchburg,. Virgiiiia,. ~nd on, to-wit, December 13, 1938, 
judgment w~~ r~D;dered by the aforesaid Court in favor of 
your petitio~e.r .~ainst B. E. Hughes in the sum of $2,251.00, 
with interest thereon from November 22, 1937, until paid, 
tog·ether wit~ -COf:!t. in .th(;' ·sum of $10.00, upon an instrument' 
waiving homestead and all other exemptions, which said judg·-
ment was doc1re~ed µi th~. Clerk's Office for the City of Lynch-
burg, Virginia, on, to-wit, December 15, 1938, in Judgment 
Lien Docket 18, page 147. An ·execution was duly issued on 
the aforesaid .judgment on,. to-wit, ~ebruary 14, 1939, and 
placed in the ha~ds of the Sergeant for the City of Lynch-
burg·, Virginia; and thereafter returned by him at the Sec-
ond April Rules,. 193~, of the afore said· Court marked by the 
said Sergeant "No Effects". On, to-wit, May 13, 1942, a 
renewal of the ~oresa~d execution was duly issued on the 
aforesaid judgment and execution and placed in the hands of 
the Sergeant of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on, to-wit, 
May 14, 1942, re_turnahle to, to-wit, Aug-ust 3, 1942, which 
said execution was duly returned by the Scrg·eant of the City 
of Lynchburg marked by him ··No Effects''; . 
page 9 ~ ( 7) Your petitioner further a11eges and charges 
that by written notice dated May 14, 1942, and duly 
served on the said City of Lynchburg, the said defendant 
and B. E. Hu.~hes by the ~ergeant' of the City of Lynchburg, 
she gave notice to the City of Lynchburg of the aforesaid 
judgment which she- had obtained against the said B. E. 
Hughes, the amount-· and cost of the aforesaid judgment, the 
date the same was recovered, the date of the issuance and 
renewal of exec~tion thereon, the return date of execution; 
/ 
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and the date of placing the execution in the hands of the 
officer, all of which will more fully and at large appear from 
the aforesaid notice which is attached hereto, marked '' Ex-
hibit A'' and prayed to be read and considered as a part 
hereof, said notice having been given pursuant to Section 
6501 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, and by virtue 
thereof the aforesaid judgment and execution became a1'1:d, 
was a valid and prior lien on the funds then held by the City 
of Lynchburg belonging to B. E. Hughes or which later c~me 
into the custody and control of the aforesaid City and be-
longing to the said B. E. Hughes; . , 
(8) Your petitioner fmther alleges and charges that exe-
cution was renewed and issued on the aforesaid judgment 
of your petitioner on, to-wit, August 3, 1942, and the said exe-
cution was placed in the hands of the Serg·eant of the City 
of Lynchburg, Virginia, on that date; that execution was 
again renewed and issued on the aforesaid judgment of your 
petitioner, on, to-wit, October 13, 1942, and the said execu-
tion was placed in the hands of the afore said Sergeant on 
that date; that execution was again renewed and issued on 
the afore said judgment of your petitioner on, to-wit, J anu-
ary 1, 1943, and the said execution was placed in the hands 
· of the aforesaid Sergeant on that date; the afore-
page 10 r said executions of August 3, 1942, and of October 
13, 1942, have been duly returned by the Serg·eant 
of the City of Lynchburg·, Virginia, and by him marked ''No 
Effects''; 
(9) Your petitioner further alleges and charges that by 
written notices bearing elate of August 3, 1942, and October 
19, 1942, and both of which were duly served on the said 
City of Lynchburg, the said defendant, and B. E. Hughes 
by the Sergeant of the aforesaid City, your petitioner gave 
notice to the City of Lynchburg of her aforesaid judgment, 
which notices contained the same information· as giv<:'n the 
City in the aforesaid notice of May 14, 1942, and which is 
more fully set out in paragraph designated No. 7 hereof and 
which will more fully and at large appear from the afore-
said notices which are attached hereto, the notice of August 
3, 1942, marked "Exhibit B" and the notice of October 19, 
1942, marked "Exhibit C" and prayed to be read and con-
sidered ~s a part hereof, said notices having been given pur-
suant to Section 6501 of the Code of Virginia, as amended; 
(10) Your petitioner further alleges and charges that by 
writte~ Diotice, dated January 2, 1943, and duly served on 
the said ·citv of Lynchburg, the said defendant, and B. E. 
Hughes by the Sergeant of the City aforesaid, the petitioner 
gave notice to the City of LynGhburg of the aforesaid judg-
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ment, which she had obtained against the said B. E. Hughes;, 
the amount and cost of the aforesaid judgment, the credit 
against the same, the date the same was recovered, the date 
of the issuance and renewal of execution thereon, the return 
date of the execution, and the date of placing the execution 
in the hands of the officer, all of which will more fully and 
at large appear from the aforesaid notice, which is hereto 
attached and marked "Exhibit D" and prayed 
page 11 ~ to be read and considered as a part hereof, said 
notice having been given pursuant to Section 6501 
of the Code of Virginia, as amended, and by virtue thereof 
the aforesaid judgment and execution became and was a valid 
and prior lien on the funds then held by the City of Lynch-
burg then belonging to B. E. Hughes ; the lien of the fieri 
f acias having been kept alive, valid and subsisting against 
the fund held by the City of Lynchburg, Virginia,· due by it 
to B. E. Hughes from May 15, 1942, and the lien of the afore-
said fieri faoias is and continues to be a valtd and subsist-
ing lien and prior to and ahead of any claim of B. E. Hug·hes, 
Dorothy Hughes, or the Peoples National Ba~ of Lynchburg, 
Virginia; 
(11) Your petitioner further alleges and charges that the 
City of Lynchburg· paid to the Peoples National Bank of 
Lynchburg the sum of $229.16 by check dated February 2, 
1942, which was in payment of the January, 1942, salary of 
B. E. Hughes; that by check dated May 6, 1942, and payable 
to B. E. Hughes, the City of Lynchburg paid the sum of 
$687 .48 in payment of the salary due B. E. Hughes for the 
months of February, March and April, 1942; that the City 
of Lynchburg·, Virginia, is now indebted to the said B. E. 
Hughes in the sum of $1,833.36, that amount being the bal-
ance due by the aforesaid City to the said B. E. Hughes for 
salary and/or wage for acting as an assessor of real estate 
for the said City; 
(12) Your petitioner further alleges and charges that 
Dorothy Hug·hes, the assignee in the salary assignment of 
November 2-7, 1941, is the daughter of B. E. Hughes, the as-
signor of the aforesaid salary assignment, dated as afore-
said, and addressed to the -City of Lynchburg; 
(13) Your petitioner further ~vers and charges that the 
aforesaid assignment from the said B. E. Hughes 
page 12 ~ to Dorothy Hughes, bearing date of -'November 
27, 1941, was and is a voluntary 'conveyance un-
der the laws of the State of Virginia and was ma.d_e without 
a valid consideration; · 
(14) Your petitioner further avers and charges . that the 
aforesaid assignment from B. E. Hughes to Dorothy Hughes 
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under date of November 27, 1941., the reassignment by the 
said Dorothy Hughes to the Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg under da.te of N oyember 29, 1941, is void, of no effect, 
and unenforceable as against your petitioner who has a 
valid, subsisting· and first lien and has had the same from 
May 15, 1942, against the fund now held by the City of Lynch-
burg·, in the sum of $1,833.36, and that the aforesaid reoples 
National Bank of Lynchburg, the assignee of Dorothy 
Hughes, has no claim against the aforesaid fund as ag·ainst 
the rights of your petitioner, a valid judgment lien creditor; 
(15) Your petitioner further alleg·es and charges that this 
Honorable Court order and declare the aforesaid assign-
ment of B. E. Hughes to be void, invalid and unenforceable 
and that your petitioner should be awarded the fund now 
held by the City of Lynchburg and which it states it is ready 
to pay or dispose of as this Court may direct. 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that she may be made a 
party defendant to the proceeding instituted by The Peoples 
National Bank of Lynchburg v. City of Lynchburg; that the 
Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, the City of Lynchburg, 
B. E. Hug·hes and Dorothy·Hughes may be made parties to 
this petition; that proper process may issue and be served 
upon th.e aforesaid parties, returnable to the First March 
Rules, 1943; that the aforesaid parties may be re-
page 13 ~ quired to answer this petition, but not under oath, 
answer under oath being hereby expressly waived; 
that the fund held by the City of Lynchburg in the sum of 
$1,833.36, as stated in its affidavit filed in these proceedings, 
be applied toward the payment of the j1:1dgment of your pe-
titioner; that it be adjudged that the judgment lien of your 
petitioner is a prior lien against the aforesaid fund held as 
aforesaid by the City of Lynchburg, and that your petitioner 
shall have such other, further, general and special relief as 
the nature of her case may require or to equity may seem 
meet and just. 
MINNIE E. KNIGHT, 
By Qounsel. 
PERROW & ROSENBERGER, p. q. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg corporation court, 
February 25th, 1943. 
This day came The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg 
and Minnie E. Knight by their respective counsel and ad-
34 '• . Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
vised the Court that they had entered into a stipulation and 
agreement as between themselves, dated February 24, 1943, 
and prayed leave to file the same in this proceeding, which 
leave being granted, same is. accordingly filed; thereupon., 
Minnie E. Knight, by couns~l,. nioved the Court to strike out 
of this proceeding the claim of The Peoples National Bank 
of Lynchburg to th~ fund held by the City of Lynchburg, a 
·party def enda:nt, on the ground that the assignment, under 
which the said Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg claims 
title to the fund in this cause, is unenforceable and does not 
comply with Section 6555a of the Code of Virginia, as 
amended, and by the consent of the parties hereto the. said 
motion is set down for arg·ument before this ·Court on the 
27th day of February, 1943. 
page: 14 } The .Stipulation referred to in the foregoing 
order is in the words and figures following, to-
wit: 
STIPULA'XION. 
. Counsel for The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, 
and counsel for Minnie E. Knight, while not agreeing as to 
all matters and facts involved in this action do agree and 
stipulate that the following facts and matters are, as between 
them, for all purposes of this case to be deemed to be true 
and treated as true and proof the1·eof is waived, to-wit: 
'l'he amount in controversy is $1,833.36, the same being the 
balance ·of the amount due from the City of Lynchburg to 
B. E. Hughes for his services as assessor of real estate; the 
employment being pursuant to the order of the· Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg, dated August 21, 1941, 
and the action of the Council of Lynchburg on September 21, 
1941, October 20, 1941, and October 27, 1941, copies of said 
order and the action of said Council being attached hereto, 
and treated as a part hereof. 
That on November 29, 1941, said B. E. Hughes executed a 
written assignment assig'Iling said sum to his daughter, 
Dorothy Hughes, who on the ~ame day in writing directed 
said City to pay the funds so assigned to her to said Peoples 
National Bank, and the copies of the same as set out in the 
claim of Minnie E. Knig·ht are true and correct, and treated 
as a part hereof. 
That a copy of said assignment by said B. E. Hughes and 
of said order or direction by said Dorothy Hughes was given 
l\L E. Knight -v. Peoples Nat. Bk. of Lynchburg, et al. 35 
to said City prior to any notice of the lien or claim of said 
~innie E. Knight ~eing given to said City. · 
That said City did not give in writing its express consent 
to said assignment or said order and direction relation 
thereto, to either said B. E. Hughes, Dorothy 
page 15· r Hughes or said Bank; and said assignment was 
not a printed assignment, nor designated ''Wage 
Assignment'', nor did it in other respects meet the require-
ments set forth in the provisions of Virginia Code, Section 
6555a. But said Bank contends that said Code Section and 
the proyisions thereof do not apply in the instant case and 
that said assig-nment by B. E. Hughes and said order an~ 
direction by said Dorothy Hughes are not rendered invalid 
or unenforceable for any failure to conform to the provisions 
of said Code Section and that Minnie E. Knight cannot claim 
the benefits of said Code Section. 
. That .if said assignment for any reason be invalid or un-
enforceable against said City, then the said Bank has no 
further claim against said fund in this action. But on the 
other hand; if said assignment by said B. E. Hughes is a good 
and valid assignment, then it is superior to the lien and claim 
of said Minnie E. Knight. 
Virginia: 
CASKIE, FROST & WATTS, 
Attys. for Peoples National Bank. 
PERROW & ROSENBERGER, 
A ttys. for Minnie E. Knight. 
At Lynchburg Corporation Court August 21st, 1941. 
The Court doth appoint B. E. Hughes and S. G. Hamner 
to assess the value of all lands and lots, together with the 
improvements thereon, with the City of Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, for the year 1942, in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 242 of the Tax Code of Virginia, as amended, 
other relevant statutes, and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion properly applicable. · - - · 
Thereupon, the said B. E. Hughes and S. G .. Hamner took 
the oath of office prescribed by law. · 
A· Copy, Teste: 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
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page 16 ~ E~~erpt fto:rfi the tni11utes of the meeting of 
the Cottnoil of the Oity of Lynchburg held Sep~ 
tember 22; 1941 
• • 
'' Messrs. S. G11rlat1d Hamne~ and It E, Hughes, the newly 
appointed nssessors~ appea11ed .-before the Council i~ conn~c-
tlott with mnt1pe11sation and ransse~sing City Real Estate. 
11:r, Hart presented a report 011 this subject, members of 
-Outtncil having previously been furnished with Mpy of re-
port, ili:~- repo~'t dealing with ~alaries . and expenses of the 
Bonrd 111 ma.king assessment in years 1934. and 1938 and 
1~eMmtnending that Council approve plan at $2,750.00 salary 
fur each nssese;qt and with expenses of $3,000.00 or a total 
of $8,500.00. After a general discussioh of this matter, Mta 
Lankford moved, and his motion was seconded by Mr. Heald, 
that the Council approve compensation and expenses in the 
~utn of $8;500.00 f tn' this work; to be divided as may be agreed 
between Mr. Hamner ahd Mr. Hughes and the motion was 
approved by the .following recorded vote. 
Ayes : Carrington, Heald, Lankford, Patterson, Sutten-
field, LichfortL 6, 
NoQSI 0. 
A Copy, Teste: 
R. ·S. HARRIS; 
Clerk of Council. 
Excerpt f rotft the minutes c,f an ndjottrned meeting of th<~ 
Council of the City of Ltnchhurg held Outober 20* 1941 . 
• 
''7rhe report of. the City Manager on A~St!ssm~nts---1942; 
presented and tead, tha Oity Manager attachi?1f; a letter from 
Messrs. B. E. Hughes arttl S. G. Hf:l,ifinijr ih which they advise 
of the acceptance of the arrangements made by 
page 17 ~ the Council to reassess r~lll. ijstate for the year 
1942, and requested that $600.00 be paid this year 
in three ettttal monthly lttstallmefits beginning October 31st 
to cover expenses and remainder of the expense money, $2,-
400.00, to be paid in 12 installments during 1942 and that the 
M. E. Knight v. Pf:lopl@1 Nat. ~ki ot Lynohburg, et al. !n 
salaries, $2,750.00 each, be pnid in equal m0I1thly installments 
during 1942 beginning.January 31st. On mption :M:r. Heald, 
seconded by .¥ra Carrington, llpprovttl was given to th8 r~-
port of tha Oity MatutgQ:r and to the request of M:essts. B, 
E, Hugheei and S. G. Ilru1u1er by the following reoorded vote, 
Ayes : Cnrrhigtott, Heald, Lankford; Patterson, Sutten=-
:lield1 LiijhfortL 6. 
Nuesi o. 
'' The resolution appro~riating the sum of $8,500.00 from 
the current revehues of the City, $600.00 of which is to be 
paid in the year 1941 covering e~penses and remainder of 
the expense money and salaries to be paid in monthly install-
ments in the year 1942, to cover expense of the 1942 real es-
tate asseSSltlent, presented and read and resolution laid over 
for action at the next meeting. 
• 
A Copy, Teste: 
• 
Rn S. ~RRIS, _ 
Clerk of Ootmcit 
. Eb:cerpt from the minut~s. of th~ meeting bf the· Ootmoil 
of the City of Lynchburg hold Ooto ber 27; 1941. · 
• • 
. _''The resoluti~n approrn·iaii~g the ~um of $8,500.00. £rom 
the current revenues . of the City for the purpose of cover'" 
ing expens11q of the 1942 rM1 estate assessment, laid over froro 
last meeting, presented ahd read. and on motion of Mr. Sut=-
tenfield, seconded by M1\ Lafikrord1 tha resolution was adopted 
by the f ollowihg recorded vote. 
page 18 ~ Ayeti3 t Carringtont Henld, Lankford, Patter~ 
. son, Suttenfield, Liohf ord. 6. 
Noes: 0. 
• 
A Copy, Toste t 
• 
R, ·S, HARRIS, 
Clerk of Council. 
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RESOLUTION". 
Be It Resolvecl,'.by the Council -~f the City of Lynchburg~ 
that the sum of $8,500.00 be and the same is hereby appro-
priated from the current revenue of the. City, $600.00 of 
which is to be paid in the year 1941 covering expenses and 
remainder of the expense money and salaries to be . paid in 
monthly installments in the year 1942, to. cover expense of 
the 1942 real estate assessment. Adopted. October 27th, 
1941. 
A Copy, Teste: 
L. E. LICHFORD, Mayor. 
R. '8. HARRIS, 
Clerk of Council. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
March 29th, 1943. 
On motion of B. E. Hughes 'and Dorothy Hughes, by coun .. 
sel, it is ordered that their petition, asking them to be made 
parties hereto, be :filed, and it is ordered that they be ad-
mitted as parties defendant hereto, and on motion of the 
plaintiff, by counsel, leave is :given it to file its statement 
of Defense to the clahn of Minnie E. Knight. And there-
upon Minnie E. Knight, by counsel, moved the court to strike 
out of this proceeding the claim of the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg· to the fund held by the City of Lynch-
burg on the additional ground that the assignment of the 
salary or compensation of B. E. Hughes, tax assessor, is 
against public ·policy & void, illegal & unenforcertble b~-
ca use_ the salary was not due to B. E. Hughes & was un-
earn~d at th~ time it was assigned by him; it be-
page 19 ~ ing compensation .to be paid him in the future, 
for services as tax assessor, and the statement 
Qf Minnie E. Knight, heretofore filed is hereby amended to 
include therein the addjtio_nal ground set forth herein & the 
said Minnie E. Knight, by counsel, objects & excepts to the 
action of the Court in making B. E. Hughes & Dorothy Hughes 
p~rties defendant to this proceeding, instead of parties plain-
tiff, and thereupon this matter was arg-ued by counsel, pur-
suant to the continuance heretofore had. 
The Petition qf B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes re-
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f erred to in the foregoing order is in the words and :figures 
following·, to-wit: 
To the Honorable S. Du Val Martin, Judge. 
There is now pending in your Court a proceeding under 
the above style, which involves the right to the sum of 
$1,833.36 held by the City of Lynchburg, and for which ac-
tion by way of notice of motion was brought against said 
City by the Peoples National Barut of Lynchburg. The sai_d 
City of Lynchburg filed an interpleader proceedings, assert-
ing that Minnie E. Knight made claim to the said fund, be-
ing· a balance due to B. E. Hughes under contract between 
him and the City of Lynchburg·. 
Proceedings were had in which the said Minnie E. Knight 
was made a party, and has .filed her claim to the said fund. 
Your petitioners request that, inasmuch as they have an 
interest in the said proceeding, particularly the said Dorothy 
Hughes, a.nd incidently the said B. E. Hughes, as the pro-
ceeds being paid to the said Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg will be applied on the indebtedness due to said Bank 
by Dorothy Hughes, and will likewise act as a credit on the 
. amount due by said B. E. Hughes to the said 
page 20 ~ Dorothy Hughes, they be admitted as parties de-
fendant in this proceeding. 
Petitioners would further show that they have read the 
statement of the defense of the Peoples National Bank of 
[;ync4burg to the claim set up in said proceeding by the said 
Minnie E. Knight, and confirm and ratify the statements 
made in said statement of defense to said claim, and they 
ratify and adopt the same as their statement of facts and 
circumstances attending the assignment by the said B. E. 
Hughes to Dorothy Hug·hes, and said Dorothy Hughes to the 
said Peoples National Bank. 
S. G. HAMNER, p. d . 
. Feb. 26, 1943. 
Respectfully, .. 
B. E. HUGHES, 
DOROTHY HUGHES, 
By Counsel. 
· The Statement of Defense referred to in the foregoing 
order is in the words and figures f oll<?.wing, to-wit: 
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Statement of Defense of Peoples National Bafik to claim 
set up by Minni~ ~- Knight. .. . . 
The Peoples National 1:hiiilt of Lyiicliburg, f tlr statement 
of its defense to the claim set up by Minnie lD. Knight, states 
as foliow~ ~ 
l. lµ i'e~ponse to ihE! all~gation i~ai _the _ass~gntfient fropi 
B. E. Hughes ~f th~_ antottht due tey liim py the City uf ~yncli.: 
burg .. wa~ ~ui4 and unijnforceabls; snid a1fogation is spe:: 
ctfically defi1ad. . .. ~ . . _ 
The Mid ttmottnt _ ~ue ~ the City 6f ~y~chburg w_as _ ¥ot 
wfig:t!s .or eialat'y withit1 the purport and intent of ~ection 
6555 (a) of the_ Code of Virginia, _which ~ontained certain .. re= 
qttirements to be complied _with f ctr sttch assig~unertt, and __ is 
_ rtot a:fte~tad by the }?rpvisi~ns of . said Section. The 
pag@ ~1 } atilottttt due by the City of ;Lynchburg· ta the said 
It :In, Hughes aros@ as £allows : 
On or_ about October •.. ,. , 1941; ihe said Jiughes; by vir= 
tue of the stattttc~s f tJr sttch cases mttd,.e and p1·ovid~d, :was 
appoittt~d by the Judge pf the Cotporati~ii Court for the City 
or Lynchburg· as g:tle _of th~. assessor.s of real estate for tl;le 
dity of Lynchburg, . Tlierea}ter; iii the .same month or early 
in N oveinber followi~g, ttttd prior tq. the assignµi~n~s here-
inafter referred to, the dHy Council, as p~ovided by law, 
fixed the ce,mpefisatfon for .tliij ass~ssors, ~nd fixed the_ com~ 
pen~ation for ~h~ said Htighes at _$2,750.00, _to be payable in 
monthly h1staIJments b~gi~riing February 1, 1942, and the 
assessme~t to be made by the assessors ii;i the yeat 1~42. 
While t4e ~()mptm_sati~rt Wa§ payab.le in monthly install; 
:rnents; the m~tliotl of_ doing tlie wot·k, liours of work, and all 
details as to the met1:toc1 of work wt3re left to the assessors, 
The City as such was only interested in the .final result, and 
exercised no supervision whatsoever over the details, the 
contract being· for a lump stlm1 pttyable in specified monthly 
installments. 
FolJo}Vifig. th@ fliii!g of the compensation by the City Coun-
cil, of l.Jyflclibutg, tli@ a§signments hereinafter referred to 
wet~ dtlfy executed, and a copy was promptly :filed in the 
proper City office. 
It is specifically denied that the said assignments, or any 
of them, were in type smaller than pica, or t4,at there _was 
any necessity for said assignments to be desighated as 
'' W ~ge Assignment'', or that the same should b~ exe~uted in 
iripli~ttfo; or cdiiform to any other requirements of law re-
lating to w11g@ ot salaty assignments. 
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ft is a1§tJ deitled thai ilie said as§igttrrients; 6r eHiier of 
them, were ex~cuted at a time when the said Hughes had not 
been employed ot ehgaged in any capacity by the City of 
_ . Lyn~hburg. Prior to the assignment the appoint-
page 22 r ineilt had beeh made; attd~ the contract. fot com:. 
pensation had been fixatl by the Cflttncil and !tc=-
cepted, it being pro~ded, h_qwever, that the work should be-
gii:i on Jattuaey l 1942 £olldwina . 
. _ H_ is. re~pectf~I1t stlbiliHted . th;l i:µe pro.visions of sooHon 
655~ (a) oL the Otide of V~t~p~a, ~e~li~~ with '!a~e ~~ .. salaty 
ass1g·nmepls, has no appium:t!~l:! to the matter mvoJved h~re, 
and that said Section of the Code is for the protection t:»£ em-
ployers, and that no one but an employer can claim ad-
vantage of the said Section or the benefits of the provisions 
thereof. 
2. The Peopl~s Natianal Ba.hit of. Lynchhttrg is not ad-
vised 1n regiatd to the exlstf!nce or validity of the judgment of 
the sa1d l\Iihnlt! E. !{night, a§ set up ih _lier .claim, nor the 
'7ai'iou~ executitnis thereon and iiotice therein ref er:iit~d to 
as having been given to the -dity of Lynchburg of the ex-
ist~nce. of said executions and tiieNJf ore demahds proof 
thereof. Neifher the said PtWples National Bank nor Dorothy 
Hughes; origfaai assignee 6f the clahn fot compensation un-
der the ~bfitrttct with ~aid B~ Et Hughes, had afiy knowledge 
of the existence. of the various @xecutioiis and notices re-
£~7:red fo in ~-~iti:i~~~itJfi. ther~Witli; as set tip iii the ciahn of 
said M1hnfo E. Ktilght: 
a. The Peop~es N. a#ortai J3J1pk is a.d~~~e.d . that th.e sip,~e-
me~t in the claµn 6f the ~aid ¥innie E. ~night. $at the City 
of Lyncliburg is how indebted to the said B. E. Hughes in 
ilie smn of $1;8BS.aa, is correct as io tlrn amount mentioii~d, 
bttt denies tliat thij said dity ie1 now ittdebtetl to the said B. E. 
l:fo -J1e~ for th~ §aid sum, and ~11eg~s ~rtcl .,c~arges :th.at t4e 
sEtif sum is du~ to the said Peoples N~tiotjal Banlt o{ _Lyn~li:. 
burg· under the assignment from B. E. Hughes to Dorothy 
Hughes, dated November 27, 1941, as follows: 
page 28 ~ , t November 27, 1941~ 
tro the city of Lynchburg . 
. ... For Value Re_caiveci 1 hereby ass~gn ~a transf e.r to parothy 
Hughes my s~la.ry as .fi:s~~s~f>r of r~~l estate fqi: the ye~f 
1942, amo_unting . to $2,750.00,.. p~yable in ¢6~thly instaU-
'.tt}efits .. b~girtnittg Febrtiitry 1, l942, to h~ applied by the said 
Dtirothy Ilughes on accotmi of my indebtt!diiess io her. 
42 Sup~e~e Co1:1~t· of. Appeals of Virginia 
Given under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
B. E. HUGHES." 
and reassignment by the said Dorothy Hughes to the said 
Peoples National Bank, as follows : 
'' I hereby direct the City of Lynchburg to pay the monthly 
installments of the above assignment to the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg, to be applied by it to the payment of my 
collateral note held by said Bank. 
Given under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941." 
4. The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg specifically 
denies the statement in the claim filed by the said Minnie 
E. Knight that the aforesaid assignment from B. E. Hughes 
to Dorothy Hughes was and is a voluntary conveyance, and 
was made without a valid consideration, and that the reas-
signment from the said Dorothy Hughes to the said Peoples 
National Bank is void and of no effect, and likewise denies 
that the said Minnie E. Knight has a subsisting first lien from 
May 15,. 1942, or at any other time had such subsisting -first 
lien on the said fund now held by the City of Lynchburg, 
and likewise denies that the said Peoples National Bank of 
Lynchburg has no claim against the aforesaid fund as 
against the said Minnie E. Knight,· but alleges and claims 
that it is entitled to said fund under valid assignment, and 
that its rights are superior and prior to any claim 
page_ 24 ~ of the said Minnie E. Knight as against said fund. 
5. The circumstances attending the assignment 
of the claim against the City of Lynchburg to the said Dorothy 
E. Hug·hes, and reassignment by her to the Peoples National 
Bank· of Lynchburg, are as follows: 
About the year 1934 the mother of Dorothy Hughes, and 
wife of B. E. Hughes, died. Under the will of John Bell 
Winfree, father of the said Mrs. Hughes, and grandfather 
of the said Dorothy Hughes and her two brothers, there was 
a trust fund which had been set up for the said Mrs. Hughes 
for her life, and at her death the principal to pass to her chil-
.dren. At the time of the death of the said Mrs. Hughes, the 
Tr:ustees under the said will distributed the principal of the 
estate, the total amount of which was approximately $37,-
000.00, to the said Dorothy Hughes and her two brot~ers, 
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and the said· brothers transferred and gave to the said 
Dorothy Hughes their interest in the said trust fund, so that 
she in effect received the whole fund. 
Subsequent thereto B. E. Hughes was :financially involved, 
and in an effort to enable him to work out his :financial prob-
lems, the said Dorothy Hughes loaned to him, to be used as 
collateral, certain of the stocks and assets which she had ac-
quired as above set out. The financial situation of Hughes 
became worse, and as a result a large part of the assets so 
loaned to the said B. E. Hugh es had been lost to said 
Dorothy Hug-hes prior to May, 1939, and the said B. E. 
Hughes was indebted to the said Dorothy Hughes in a large 
amount for the said assets so lost. 
On or about the 29th da.y of May, 1939, and prior thereto, 
the said B. E. Hughes was indebted to the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg, in a large sum, and included in the col-
lateral held by said Bank for the said indebted-
page 25 ~ ness there were stocks belonging to and standing_ 
in the name of said Dorothy Hughes, and which 
she had acquired from the estate of her grandfather and by 
gifts from her brothers as above set out. The said stocks 
so held as of May 29, 1939, were appraised as follows: 
20 shares First National Bank of Lynchburg @ 
6 
9 " " 
$150.00 
J. R. Millner Co. pfd. @ $100.00 
Lynchburg Nlanuf acturers Bldg., Inc., 






In addition, the said Bank held among other collateral the 
following assets which had belonged to B. E. Hughes, and 
which it was eon tern plated selling: 
1 share First National Bank of Lynchburg 
1 " Lynchburg· Manufacturers Bldg. Inc. 
pfd. 
29 '' Same, com. @ $5.00 
29 " Low Volatile Coal Co., com. @ $1.00 
1 '' Craddock-Terry Co~ 1st pfd. 
18 '' Same, 3rd pfd. @ $20.00 
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The said bond of B. E. and A. B. W. Hughes, with a bal-
ance due of $121.49 thereon, really had no value. It origi.~ 
lially represented a loan on property owned by the 
makers of the bond, and secured by a deed of trust 
page 26 ~ on real estate. Following def a ult in the payment 
of the bond, which was held by the _PeopleE Na-
tional Bank, the property was sold under the deed of trust 
and the credit of $378.51 represented the net proceeds . from 
the sale paid to the Bank as holder by the Trustee, which 
said note had continued to be held by the Bank~ 
Desiring to relieve bet father tb some extent of the Bank 
indebtedness, and to get in her own possession the stocks be-
longing to her, and which had been loaned to her father, tli.e 
said Dorothy Hughes; in cooperation with, and through her 
father in the month of May, 1939, proposed to the said Bank 
that she should borrow the appraised value of her stock and 
of the dther assets in the name of B. E. Hughes, as above 
set out, and held by the Bank as collateral, and that the Bank 
shduld lend her the sum of $6,800.00, with the said stocks 
and assets as collateral for her note, and she would there- . 
upon buy the said stocks and assets and pay to the said Bank 
on the note of said B. E. Hughes the sum of $6,800.00, and 
the said B. E. Hughes would then owe her the sum of $6,800.00, 
which she was paying; on his obligations and for her own 
stocks. The said Bank a.gTeed, and accordingly the stocks 
in tlie name. of the said Dorothy Htighes; and which had been 
co11tinuously hi her name since the year 1934, when she had 
acquired them as above ·recited, were released as collateral 
on the note of the said B. E; Hugh es, and the other assets 
sta.11ding in the name of said R E. Hughes were delivered 
to her, and she executed her note dated May 29, 1939, for 
$6,845.34, covering the value of her own stocks, $4,500.00, the 
value of the assets in the name of B. E. Hughes at the valua-
tion of $2,300.00, and the additional $45.34, representing dis-
M. E. Knight v. Peoples Nat. Bk. of Lynchburg; et aL 43 
count for sixty days on the note which was included there-
with. Said note with the collateral has been renewed from 
time to time and is still held by the Bank subject 
page 27 ~ only to very small payments which have been made 
thereon, the balance being largely in excess of the 
amount due by the City of Lynchburg on the aforesaid con-
tract with B. E. Hughes: 
The Peoples National Bank is informed that the said B. E~ 
Hughes is not only indebted to the said Dorothy Hughes in 
the amount of $6,800.00, with interest from May 29, 1939, and 
was so indebted at the time o.f the assignment to her as above 
~et out, but also that the said B. E. Hughes is further largely 
indebted to the said Dorothy Hughes. f ot assets of hers 
which he had borrowed from her and which had been sold 
as collateral for his loans and obligations, and that after 
applying all credits agE;tinst said indebtedness, there is still 
a further balance due to the said Dorothy Hug·4es by the 
said B. E~ Hughes. It is the ref ore further alleged and 
charg·ed that the said B. E. Hughes at the time of the assign-
ment was indebted to the said Dorothy Hughes, not only to 
the extent of $6,800.00, including the value of her assets, 
which had been loaned to the said B. E. Hughes and were 
held as collateral as above set out, and which values the said 
Dorothy Hughes actually paid in cash to the said Bank on 
May 29, 1939, but was also further indebted to her as above 
set out. 
The Peoples N ationill Bank thtts alleges and charges that 
the said assignments were valid and binding, ~nd. were for 
specific talid obligations due by the.said B. E. Hughes to the 
said Dorothy Hughes; and likewise that the said assignment 
from the said Dorothy Hughes of the amount due to be ap-
plied ori her obligation at the Peoples National Bank is valid 
and enforceable. 
Petitioner allages and charges that the said Minnie E. 
Knight has no claim against the fund involved in this pro-
ceeding; .and that the said Peoples National Bank 
page 28} nn~er its assignment is entitled to the fund herein 
involved~ . 
PEOPLE.S NATION.AL BANK OF LYNCHBURG, 
By Counsel. 
CASKIE; FROST & WATTS, p. q. 
, At another day; to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
April ~nd, 1943~ 
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This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the court 
having on March 29, 1943, heard arg'UIDent of respective coun-
sel for the respective_ parties upon the motion of Minnie E. 
Knight to strike out the claim of the Peoples National Bank 
of Lynchburg, and having taken time to consider of its de-
cision, and having now maturely considered the matter, the 
court doth overrule the said motion, all in accordance with 
its views and reasons expressed in its written opinion which 
on motion of respective counsel for said bank and Minnie E. 
Knig·ht is made a part of the record in these proceedings as 
fully as if herein set out at length. 
The court doth prescribe that the issue to be submitted 
in these proceedings to a jury for its determination shall be, 
·'whether there was valuable consideration for the assign-
ment dated Nov. 27, 1941, made by B. E. Hughes to Dorothy 
Hughes of his compensation as assessor of real estate". And 
the. court directs that the Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg·, B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes shall be .considered 
the plaintiffs in said issue. 
To the action of the court in overruling her said motion, 
Minnie E. Knight, by counsel, excepted. 
The Opinion of the Court referred to in the fore-
page 29 ~ going order is in the words and figures following, 
· to-wit: 
Court's opinion upon the motion of Minnie E. Knight to 
strike out the claim of Peoples Nat. Bank. April 2, 1943. 
B. E. Hug·hes, an assessor of land for the City of Lynch-
burg·, by a written assig"Ilment assigned his compensation as 
assessor to his daughter, Dorothy Hughes, to whom it is al-
leged he was indebted, and she transferred same to the Peo-
ples Nat. Bank of Lynchburg. 
The assig"Ilment does not conform to the provisions of Code 
Sec. 6555(a) nor did the City in writing give its consent to 
the assignment. The assignment was not made until after 
Hughes had been appointed assessor and an agreement· be-
tween him and the City had been reached as to the amount 
and payment of his compensation and expenses as assessor. 
In other words, the fund assigned had a potential existence 
at the time of the assignment, though it was then unearnPd 
compensation of a City of·ficial. 
The City, without any written acceptance of the assign-
ment, but havin~ been given the assignment or notified 
thereof, proceeded to honor same by paying for several 
months to the Bank the monthly installments originally due 
to Hughes under its agreement with him relative to his com-
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pensation as assessor. Then the City was served with notices 
under the provisions of Code Sec. 6501 to the effect that Min-
nie E. Knight was a judgment creditor of Hughes and 
claimed a lien on the compensation then or thereafter to be-
come due to Hughes as assessor, by reason of certain execu-
tions issued on her judgment, and the City thereupon made 
no further payments on said assignment. 
Action was later brought by the Bank against the City to 
recover on the assignment an accrued balance of $1,833.36, 
which would have been originally due by tl1e City 
page 30 r to Hughes as compensation as assessor. 
The City in that action filed an af.:fidavit and in4 
terpleader under the provisions of Code Sec. 6151, disclaim-
ing· any interest in said fund and reciting the claim made 
thereto by :Minnie E. Knight and offering to pay said fund 
as the court might direct. 
Under the provisions of Code Sec. 6151 and upon order 
of the court, Minnie E. Knight appeared and filed a state-
ment of the nature of her claim and now seeks to maintain 
same, and toward that end moved that the claim of the Bank 
be stricken out on the ground, in substance, that the assign-
ment is void, unenforceable and of no effect as to her for 
each of two reasons which in substance are as follows, namely: 
(1) The assignment does not comply with the provisions of 
Code Sec. 6555 (a) ; and ( 2) The thing assigned is unearned 
salary or compensation of a public official or employee. 
B. E. Hug·hes and Dorothy Hughes, were on their petition 
admitted as parties defendant to the proceedings. 
We consider first the question of whether the assignment 
is invalid or unenforceable because it fails to comply with 
the provisions of Code Sec. 6555 (a). 
This is .a new code section enacted by the 1940 legislature 
(Acts 1940, page 899, Chap. 432). No decisions have been 
rendered by our Supreme Court of Appeals construing same. 
Counsel have ref erred to no construction of similar statutes 
by the Courts of other states. The question presented is one 
of first impression. 
The court is of opinion that the provisions of Code Sec. 
6555 (a) should not be extended to apply to anything except 
'' salary or wages'' and that it was not the pur-
page 31 ~ pose of the legislature to hamper, restrict, or pre-
scribe a form for, any assignment except an as-
sjp:nment · of "salary or wages''. 
·while salary or wages a.re compensation for personal 
services; not all compensation for personal service are salary 
or wage~. The services performed in the usual manner upon 
the usual basis of compensation by lawyers, doctors, other 
4& Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
professional men, artists and many others, are personal serv-
ices, yet their compensation is not salary or wages. The com-
pensation 0£ an independent contractor is not salary or wages. 
It seems to the court that the payment of salary or wages 
as compensation for personal services, involves the idea that 
the person receiving the salary or wag·es is at least to a 
reasonable degree under direction or control of the person 
paying the compensation, and that the person paying the 
salary or wages has the right to employ and discharge the 
person to whom the salary or wages are paid, and to exercise 
some supervision and control over him and his work. 
The City cannot select the assessor. The assessor .is ap-
pointed for the City by the Court.· The City cannot discharge 
or remove the assessor; he may be removed only by the 
Court appointing him. The City has no control or super-
vision whatever over the assessor nor any of his work. The 
City has nothing whatever to do with the assessor or his du-
ties aµd work, except to prescribe his compensation and to 
pay· same under the provisions of Sec. 242 of the Tax Code, 
and, incidentally, the emoluments of an assessor are therein 
referred to not as salary or wages, but as compensation. 
It is contended that since the City and the assessor them-
selves referred to the compensation as being "salary", it 
is therefore in fact and law salary, and no further 
page 32 ~ inquiry or consideration can be made or given by 
the court to the matter. The Court does not agree 
with this contention. The persons who handle or use a spa.de 
may loosely refer to it as a hoe, or may even solemnly de-
clare it to he a ho~, but if it is in fact and in law actually a 
spade, we believe the courts shouid hold it to he a spade. 
The Court is of opinipn that the compensation of the as-
sessor is not '' salary or wage~'' and that thereforP. the pro-
visions of Code s·ec. 6555 (a) do not apply to this assignment 
and the assignment is not invalid or unenforceable because 
it does not conform to the :provistons of that code section. 
But however this may be, the Court is of the fu.rther opin-
ion that Code Sec. 6555 (a) · was enacted for the benefit of 
the "P-mployer'', and even if the com1)<msation of the asses-
sor be d~erried to b~ "s~lary or wages" aud· that the City is 
the "employer" of the assessor, still no one but the City 
could complain that the assignment did 11ot conform to the 
provisions of that section, and th~ city makes no such com-
plaint. We think that as contended by counsel for the bank, 
the situation is somewhat" analogQus · to sundry statutes of 
limitations or other defenses to actions which, notwi.thstand-
in~; the lac)r Qf words in the s~at~tes denoting anf .such re-
/ 
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striction, are held to have been enacted for the sole benefit 
of the defendant or party sought to b~ charged, and cannot 
be availed of or asserted by any other person although the 
. rights or priorities of such other person may be affected by 
the failure of the person for whose benefit such statutes 
were enacted to assert or claim the benefit thereof. 
We are strengthened in our view that Code Sec. 6555 (a) 
waij enacted for the benefit of the employer and not for the 
benefit of third persons who are not parties to the 
page 83 } assignment of salary or wages, not only from the 
general langµage used in the statute, but because 
the employer under the terms of the statute may by his sole 
~ct of giving his written consent to the assignment of salary 
or wages, thereby bind himself and obviate and remove the 
need of any compliap.ce .a.t all with any of the provisions of 
this statute, and this is trtJ.e notwithstanding the rights of 
third persons or creq.ito:rs of the assignor may be seriously 
affected by this sole act of the employer. -
The fact that the st~tQ.te contains an exception and does not 
apply to assignments. of salary or wages if the employer 
gives his express written consent thereto, does not mean that 
even though the employer does not give his written consent 
to an assignment whieh does not conform to the statutory 
r~q"Q.ir~ments, third persons not parties to the assignment can 
avail themselves of the benefits of the statute, for in our view 
the ~mployer may waive tlie benefits of this statute if he so 
desires, either expressly or by simply not availing himself of 
:his rights theretJ.nder, anq. no one else can complain, nor have 
the benefits of the statq.te, nor attack the assignment for its 
failure t9 comply wit~ the statute. 
Our co:µclusiori in this phase of the matter is that the fail-
ure of the a~signment to ·conform to or comply with the pro-
visions of Code See. 6555( a) does not inure to the benefit 
of Minnie E. Knight nor render the assignment invalid or 
unenforceable as to her. 
,v e now consider the· contention that the thing assigned 
was 11nearn~cl salary or compensation of a public city offi. 
cial and that' no lawful or valid assignment of same could be 
made. 
Counsel for Mrs. Knight ref er to the cases Stephenson 
v. Kyle (W. Va.), 24 S. E. 886, decided in 1896, 
page 34 r to the more recent case of Fischer v. Liberty Nat. 
· Bank ~ Trust Co., 61 Fed. 2d 757, decided 1932, 
and ~rising i:n New York, and to Restatement, Contracts, 
Secs. 151 and 574. All of which but hold or state the rule 
obtaining in probably a majority of jurisdictions, that as-
signments by assessors or other public officers are invalid 
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as being against public policy. Many other cases and au-
thorities to the same effect could have been cited. No Vir-
ginia cases were cited or found dealing with assignments of 
unearned compensation by public officials, though the ques-. 
tion of validity or garnishment and attachment of compensa-
tion of public officials has been considered in Virginia. 
The principle involved is that it is against public policy to 
permit the unearned compensation of a public official to be 
the subject of attachment, garnishment, execution or assign-
ment, because to -do so would detract from the efficiency of 
the public officer by stripping him of further inducement to 
perform his duties and thus chill his efforts: and for the 
further reason, as referred to in Ports1nouth Gas Co. v. San-
ford, 97 Va.. 124, (which case deals with garnishment or at-
tachment. and not assignment), namely: to permit the govern-
ment or branches thereof to be subjected to actions, judg-
ments and expenses about matters in which they have no 
interest is undesirable, and to make them instruments for 
collection of private debts is thoug·ht to detract from their 
dignity and be subversive of the public interest. 
These reasons for such public policy, seem to us, to be far 
less applicable to assig·nments than to attachments, g-arnish-
ments or other legal proceedings. To take the unearned 
compensation from a man ag·ainst his will by legal proceed-
ings of garnishment, etc., might tend to chill his 
page 35 ~ efforts to perform his public duties, and would 
involve his employer in such legal proceedings. 
But to permit a man of bis own free will and accord to assign 
his unearned compensation in liquidation of an honest debt 
which he desires to satisfy, would, it seems to us, have no 
tendency to chill his efforts to perform his public duties, 
but might be a spur for the better performance of his duties 
by freeing his mind of that debt and the likelihood of his 
being sued thereon or having to incur legal expenses inci-
dent thereto: and an assignment not being a legal proceed-
ing, the government is not brougllt into court thereon at all, 
and suffers no inconvenience save paying the compensation 
to the holder of the assignment, at the request of its employee, 
rather than to the employee. However this reasoning may 
be, Virginia, whatever her ancient public policy may have 
been, has as to all city officials and employees long· ago ex-
pressly provided that their salary and wages shall be sub-
ject to garnishment and execution (Code Sec. 6560), and as 
if to make certain that no city official or employee could 
escape paying his honest debts under the guise that it was 
ag·ainst the public policy of Virginia to force him to give up 
his official compensation for that purpose, Code Sec. 6561 
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expressly provides in effect that if he receives any compen-
sation for his services to the city from the moneys of the 
city, he shall, for the purposes of garnishment, be deemed 
an officer, clerk or employee of the City. 
Whatever may be the rule in other states, Virginia, by 
statute expressly authorizes the taking· away from city offi-
cials and employees by garnishment or execution their com-
pensation for public services, whether same be earned or un-
earned at the time of the g·arnishment or notice of lien of 
execution, for under each of these legal proceed-
page 36 ~ ings the fund caught is not only that due at the 
time of the service of the process but also that 
not then due but which will thereafter become due until the 
return day of the process. 
It is true that Code Sec. 6560 does not expressly mention 
assignments of compensation by city of,.ficials and employees. 
vVe are not certain that Virginia has ever had or followed 
a public policy of forbidding assignments of compensation 
by city officials and employees. If she ever did have such 
a policy it is likely that the word assignment would have 
been included along with words garnishment and execution 
in Code Sec. 6560 which in effect abolishes any previous pub-
lic policy that prevented the salary or wages of city of fi.-
cials and employees from being subjected to execution and 
garnishment. 
As we see it, there has never existed as sound or good 
reasons, however wecik all such reasons may be, for any state 
to follow a public policy of not allowing a voluntary assign-
ment by a city of.ficial or employee of his compensation for 
public services, as there existed for not allowing g·arnish-
ments, executions. attachments or other legal proceedings 
directed at depriving him of such compensation against his 
will and forcing- tl1e government to become a party to legal 
proceeding·s. 
And we feel that if Virginia ever had a public policy for-
bidding such assi~nments, when Virginia changed by statute 
( Code -Sec. 6560) her public policy as to compensation of 
~itv officials so as to make same whether earned or unearned 
liable to garnishment and execution, the legislature by im-
plication intended to make same also the subject of volun-
tarv as~ig11ment. 
Sometimes the courts in construing statutes and in an ef-
fort to carrv out their real purpose and intent, are com-
pelled to depart from the literal words of the 
pa~o :17 } f:tatnte, and to sometimes hold that the statute in-. 
eludes something not expressly mentioned. To 
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illustrate: Ha;wes v. '1.'ri_qg, 110 Va. 165 (Cited by counsol 
for the Bank) is a case holding that although a Federal stat-
ute declared that an assignment of any claim ag·ainst the 
Federal Governme11t was void, yet under the circumstances 
of that case, such an assignment wa~ held not be void; and 
since the statute was enacted for the benefit of the govern-
ment the government could waive or refuse to claim the 
benefits of the statute, and no one else could claim such bene-
fits. And in that case another case is referred to in which 
Mr. Justice Harlan said that the statute then in question "is 
not to be interpreted according to the literal acceptation 
of the words used''. Again, our own Court of Appeals in 
Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford (supra), 97 Va. 124, in treat-
ing· of our statute (now Code Sec. 6560) which permits gar-
nishment or execution against the compensation of city of-
ficers and employees, but which does not authorize the gar-
nishment of a city for any other type of debt, holds that 
since the statute permits garnishment of such compensation, 
no reason is known why the city might not as well be gar-
nisheed for another type of debt and sustains a garnish-
ment against the city for a wholly different type of debt than 
that of compensation due to city officials or employees men-
tioned in the statute. 
We find no statute nor decision in Virginia forbidding .a 
city of,ficial or employee from assigning his unearned com-
pensation. The Virginia statute makes the same subject to· 
garnishment and execution. We know of no reason why the 
same should not also be the subject of voluntary assig-n-
ment. 
It is contended that Code Sec. 6560 is in derogation of 
common law and should be strictly construed, but it is not 
shown that in Virginia that there ever was any 
page 38 ~ common law rule forbidding assignment by city 
officials of unearned compensation. The matter 
here involved is purely one of Public Policy of the state: 
and that policy whatever it be, was for the benefit of the 
state and not for private persons whether such private per-
son be the city official or his creditor. We doubt whether 
the action of a state in changing its public policy in such 
matters is subject to the rule of construction that a statute 
in derogation of common law is to be strictly construed. 
But however this may be, the court being satisfied that as-
sig·nments are embraced within the true meaning· and pur-
poses sought to be accomplished by ·Code Sec. 6560, will so 
hold. We have an illustration of our court embracing within 
the meaning of that statute something not.literally expressed 
therein in the case of Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford (supra), 
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97 Va. 124. l\foreo.ver, to hold that a city official cannot as-
sign his unearned compensation althougih same may be 
reached by g·arnishment or execution, would we fear make 
the law an ass, for then an honest city official or employee 
who wished to satisfy a just creditor and save himself the 
humiliation of being sued and garnisheed and to avoid the 
expense of court proceedings, would be for bidden to accom-
plish the desired ends and purposes voluntarily by assign-
ing his unearned compensation, but would have to allow his 
creditor to sue him, or obtain judgment, then subject the 
compensation to the debt by execution or garnishment. All 
for naught, since the city official was already willing for the 
creditor to have his unearned compensation. · 
It has been suggested that by permitting a city official to 
assign his unearned compensation he would be thereby per-
mitted to pref er one creditor -above another, this is true, but 
in Virginia a debtor has the right to prefer one 
. pag·e 39 r creditor above another, and may even confess 
judgment in favor of one creditor in order to give 
him priority over another. Employees of others than cities 
may by their assignment of unearned salary prefer one 
creditor above another, no reason is advanced as to why a 
city official or employee should not have the same, right to 
prefer one creditor above another. 
0:ur conclusion of this phase is that a city of.ficial or em-
ployee may assign his unearned compensation. 
The motion made by Minnie E. Knig·ht to strike out the 
claim of the Peoples Nat. Bank is overruled. 
And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation 
Oourt, April 26th, 1943, the date first hereinbefore men-
tioned. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and they de-
manding a jury, there came a jury, to-wit, H. M. Beck, B. S. 
Elam, Emory O. Martin, E. L. Morris, Chas. E. Robinson, 
John R. Weaver and Chas. E. Whitaker, who were duly 
summoned, selected, tried and sworn according to law to try 
the issue joined as· to ''whether there was· valuable consid-
eration for the assignment dated Nov. 27, 1941, made by B. 
E. Hug·hes to Dorothy Hughes of his compensation as asses-
sor of real estate'', and having heard the evidence, the plain-
tiff, Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, by its attorneys, 
moved the court to strike the evidence of the defendant, 
Minnie E. Knight, on the ground that it fails to show as a 
matter of law that there was not valuable consideration for 
th.~ ~ssignment dated Nov. 27, 1941, made by B. E. Hughes 
Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
to Dorothy Hughes of his compensation as assessor of real 
estate, and said motion .being fully argued, the court doth 
sustain the same, and doth order that the evidence of the 
said defendant, Minnie E. Knight, be stricken out, to which 
the defendant, Minnie E. Knight, by her attor-
page 40 ~ neys, excepted, for reasons dictated to the court 
reporter for purposes of the record, and there-
upon the jurors aforesaid were sent to their room to con-
sider of the verdict to be given in the premises, and after 
sometime returned into court with the following verdict, to-
wit, ''We the jury find there was no consideration for the 
assignment. H. M. Beck, Foreman." Thereupon, the plain-
tiff, Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, by its attorneys, 
moved the court to set aside said verdict, on the ground that 
it is contrary to the law and the evidence, and upon the 
ground that there was valuable consideration for the assign-
ment aforesaid, which motion the court doth sustain, and 
doth order that said verdict be set aside, to which action and . 
ruling of the court the defendant, Minnie E. Knight, by her 
attorneys, excepted, for the reasons aforesaid. And it ap-
pearing to the court as a matter of law that there was valu-
able consideration for the assignment dated Nov. 27, 1941, 
made by B. E. Hughes to Dorothy Hughes of his compensa-
tion as assessor of real estate, it is considered by the court 
that the said Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg rooover 
against the defendant, City of Lynchburg, $1,833.36, the 
amount due under said assignment, as shown by the af,fida-
vit of interpleader filed by the defendant, City of Lynch-
burg. 
And, on motion of the plaintiff, Peoples National Bank 
of Lynchburg, by its attorneys, the court doth order that 
the said defendant, Minnie E. Knight, pay the taxable costs 
of this proceeding, to which the said Minnie E. Knight, by 
her attorneys, objected, and excepted, for the reasons afore-
said. 
Thereupon, the defendant, Minnie E. Knight, by her at-
torneys, moved the court to set aside its judgn1ent aforesaid 
in favor of the plaintiff, Peoples National Bank of Lynch-
burg, on the g·round that it is contrary to the law 
page 41 ~ and the. evidence, and upon the ground that the 
assignment aforesaid was without valuable con-
sideration and was therefore void and of no effoot, and en-
ter up final judgment in favor of the said defendant, Minnie 
E. Knight, which motion the court overruled, and the said 
defendant, Minnie E. Knig·ht, by her attorneys, excepted, 
for the reasons afore said. 
At the instance of the said defendant, Minnie E._Knight, 
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who, by her attorneys, intimated her intention to apply for 
a writ of ,error and supersedeas to the foregoing judgment, 
the court doth order that execution of said judgment be sus-
pended for the period of thirty days from this date, upon 
condition that the said Minnie E. Knight, or some o_ne for her, 
execute within ten days from this date, a proper suspend-
ing bond, conditioned according to law, in the penalty of 
$200.00. 
At another day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
April 30~h, 1943. 
Upon the motion of Minnie E. Knight, who, by her .attor-
neys, has heretofore intimated ·her intention to apply for a 
writ of error and s1tpersedeas to the judg·ment entered in 
this case on April 26, 1943, and upon the consent of The 
Peoples National Bank, B. E. Hughes, Dorothy Hughes, as 
evidenced by the endorsement of this order by their re-
spective attorneys, the Court doth Order that execution of 
said judgment be suspended for a period of sixty days from 
April 26, 1943, upon condition that Minnie E. Knight, or 
someone for her, execute within ten days from the 26th day 
of April, 1943, a proper suspending bond, conditioned ac-
cording to law, in the penalty of $200.00, and the order en-
tered herein on the 26th day of April, 1943, is hereby modi-
fied and amended to that extent. · 
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In the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg. 
Stenographic report of testimony, motions, objections, ex-
ceptions, and other incidents of trial, is in the words and 
:figures following·, to-wit: 
The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, B. E. Hughes and 
Dorothy Hug·hes, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
City of Lynchburg· and Minnie E. Knig·ht, Defendants. 
Stenographic report of the testimony, together with the 
motions, objections and exceptions on the part of the re-
spective parties, the action of the court in respect thereto, 
and other incidents of the trial of The Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg, B. E. Hug-hes and Dorothy Hughes 
versus City of Lynchburg and Minnie E. Knight, tried in 
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B. E. Hughes. 
the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, 
on April 26th, 1943, before Honorable S. Du Val Martin and 
Jury. 
Present: Mr. Jam.es R. Caskie, counsel for The Peoples 
National Bank of Lynchburg, and Mr. S. G. Hamner, coun-
sel for B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes. Messrs. William 
Rosenberg·er, Jr., and Mosby G. Perrow, Jr., counsel for Min-
nie E. Knight. 
page 43 ~ MR. B. E. HUGHES, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr.· Caskie: 
Q. Mr. Hughes, you are the father, I believe, of Miss 
Dorothy Hughes. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was your wife? 
A. Annie Bell Winfree. 
Q. Daughter of whom Y 
A. John Bell Winfree. 
Q. Your daughter, Miss Dorothy Hughes, was she inter-
ested in any trust estate under the will of Mr. John Bell 
Winfree! . 
A. He set up in his will four trust funds, one for my wife, 
and the other three for other parties. My wife received 
income on that durin~· her natural life. At her death it was 
to be paid to her children. She died in 1934 and the estate 
went to my two sons and daughter, ,John Bell Hughes, G. W. 
Hug·hes and Dorothy Hughes. The two sons gave their in-
terest in it to my daughter so that she received it all, or. 
practically all of it. 
Q. Were you one of the trustees under that will? 
A. I was one of the. executors and trustees. 
Q. ·Who were the others Y 
A. Robert Winfree, John B. Winfree, C. W. Gooch and 
myself were the four executors. 
Q. Were you acting as trustee at the time of 
page 44 ~ your wife's death? 
A. I was one. ·John Winfree and Mr. Gooch 
were the other two acting. · 
Q. When that ~as turned over to Miss Dorothy Hughes 
did she receive any stock in the First National Bank? 
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B. E. Hughes. 
A. She did.. She recefred 56 shares of stock of the First 
National Bank, 9 shares Lynchburg Manufacturing Build-
ing, Inc., 6 shares J. R. Millner Company, and some other 
stocks.· 
Q. Do you know when that was transferred to her7 
A. .Sometime in the year 1934. 
Q. I hand you herewith certificate of The First National 
Bank of Lynchburg to Miss Dorothy Hughes of 20 shares 
of stock issued on June 18, 1934. Do you know whether that 
was part of the stock she received under that will 7 
A. That was part of the stock that she received under that 
will. 
Q. I note on the back the assignment on the baek is in 
blank; It was endorsed by Dorothy Hughes, is undated, and 
is witnessed by you. Why was that endorsement put on 
thereY 
A. I borrowed the stock from her to use as collateral in 
the Peoples National Bank. She signed her name on the back 
of it and I witnessed it before turning it over to Mr. Vic-
tor. 
Q. I hand you another certificate of J. R. Millner,-
pa&·e 45 ~ By the Court: (interposing) One moment. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, you say you borrowed that stock from 
your daughter 7 
A. I did. 
Q. Was there any understanding at the time you borrowed 
that stock that you would return that stock to her or pay the 
equivalent of its value? 
A. I borrowed it. She did not give it to me. I did not ask 
her to give it to me. I borrowed it and expected to pay it 
back and she expected me to pay it back. 
Q. It was understood at the time it was to be returned or 
paid for? 
A. That is right. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
. Q. As a matter of fact, what were your expectations 7 Did 
you expect to pay it back by returning the stock? 
A. I expected to arrange the loans and return the stock to 
her. That was my purpose. . . 
· Q. I hand you certificate of the J. R. Millner Co., Inc., 236, 
6 shares of its preferred stock, dated June 14, 1934, with en-
dorsement in blank, undated, similar to the other one. 
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A. Identically the same. 
Q. Was that part of the assets she received from the trust 
estate! 
A. That is a certificate of stock she received 
page 46 ~ from the estate which she loaned me under ex-
. actly the same circumstances, to be used by me as 
collateral and which I was to pay her for or return. 
Q. I now hand you herewith certificate of Lynchburg Manu-
facturers Building·, Incorporated, No. 79, for three shares of 
preferred stock issued to Dorothy Hughes on the 27th day 
of June, 1934, and with the similar undated assignment en-
dorsement on the back. Was that likewise a part of the as-
sets she received from the Winfree trust estate? 
A. That is one of the certificates of stock she received 
from her grandfather's estate which I borrowed from her to 
be used as collateral and to be paid for or returned. 
Q. I notice these assignments are undated. Do you recall 
about when the date was you got them! 
A. My recollection is it was about '36. I haven't looked 
back to see. Somewhere along there I borrowed them to use 
as collateral· in bank because my assets were dwindling so 
fast, values going down, that the bank wanted more col-
lateral and it was used that way. 
Q. You had a loan in the bank then previous to the bor-
rowing of this stock T 
A. I had a loan there-been doing business there for a good 
many years. 
Q. This then was not put up as an original collateral but 
as additional collateral Y 
A. Might have been some money borrowed at 
page 47 ~ the time. I don't recall exac.tly how it was worked, 
but it was put up as collateral, additional col-
lateral. Everv dollar that was borrowed from the bank was 
used in my business and not a dollar of it went to my daugh-
ter. 
Q. Going back now to 1939, did this stock remain in the 
bank up until 1939 as collateral for your note? 
A. The stock remained that wa.y until 1939, at which time 
the bank insisted that something had to be done or they 
would have to sell the collateral, so at that time I arranged 
with Mr. Victor that my daug·hter would buy from the ba.nk 
$6,800.00 worth of that collateral at a valuation that was put 
on it at that time-a good deal more than it is worth today--
so that my daughter executed her note to the bank for the 
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$6,800.00, and every dollar went to credit on my indebtedness 
to the bank. She didn't get a dollar of it. 
Q. Now, you spoke of the $6,800.00. Do you know who 
appraised this stock? 
A. The bank put the valuation on which they were willing 
to let it go for, which was far more than it is worth today. 
Q. Do you know what valua.tion was put on The First Na-
tional Bank stock T · 
A. $150.00 a share. 
Q. The J. R. Millner Company preferred? 
A. $100.00 a share. 
page 48 ~ Q. There were six shares of that which made 
$600.00. Now, the nine shares of Lynchburg Man-
ufacturers Building, Inc., preferred? 
A. $100.00 a share. 
Q. T:hat makes $4,500.00 for the valuation of these three 
certificates. 
A. That makes $4,500.00, for which I owe her every penny 
today, with the exception of about $900.00 that has been paid 
bv the Citv on account of tlmt order. The balance of some-
thing over' $1.1800.00 is still due. Q. Now, you 1rnd other assets. Do you know what those 
other assets were thnt she purc]1ased? Have you got a memo-
randum? 
A. I have no memorandum but I can almost repeat them. 
One was a certificate of Guarantee Title and Bond Corpora-
tion on wllich 66% of the $4,000.00 bad been paid. 
Q. Leaving- $1,360.00 balance. 
A. One Rl1are of First National Bank of Lynchburg. 
Q. That was $150.00. 
A. One s]rnre of Lynchburg Manufacturers Building, In-
corporated, $100.00. There was some coal stock there of 
little value. I don't recnll the name. 
Q. As a matter of fact, did you give me a list of those? 
A. Yes, sir, I ~rn ve you a list. 
Q. Did I put tl1cm down and you go over them and check 
them? 
pa-ge 49 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Just read them out of the Answer 
will he all riQ.·bt. 
By Mr. Caskie: According to this the other assets were: 
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1 share First National Bank of Lynchburg · 
1 share Lynchburg Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. pfd. 
29 shares same1 common at $5.00 
29 shares Low Volatile Coal Co., common at $1.00 
1 share Craddock· Terry Co. 1st pfd. 
18 shares Same, 3rd pfd. at $20.00 
3 shares Same, common a.t $10.00 
Participating Certificate Guarantee Title 
and Bond Corporation-Face $6,000.00 








Balance $1,960. 1,360.00 
Bond of B. E. and A. B. W. Hughes- $ 500.00 
Less Credit 378.51 
$ 121.49 66.00 
Total · $2,300.00 
By Mr. Caslde: 
Q. Now, Mr. Hughes, this total of $2,300.00 for these as-
sets on this list and the $4,500.00 for the Dorothy Hughes 
stocks make the $6,800.00. 
A. Tbat makes the $6,800.00, yes sir. 
· Q. I believe the Guarantee Title and Bond Corporation ,ms 
in fact in liquidation. 
pa~;e 50 ~ A. That was in liquidation at that time but was 
taken in as the value due on it. Since tbu.t ti.me 
some of that has been sold at twenty-five ~ents on the dollar. 
Q. Twentv-five cents on the dollar of its face valueT 
A. On the balance of the face value. 
Q. And you put it here at face value f 
A. Face value. 
By Mr. Caskie: (addressing the Court) I don't want to 
file tbeRe certificates because they are, of course, collateral 
nt tbe bank now· for her loan. 
Bv the Court: Yon can't introduce them then. The °\\'it-
ncsR· has testified a.s to their substance and you don't }Jave 
to introduce the certificates. J' · 
Bv Mr. Caskie: 
·Q. Mr. Hughes, have you repaid anything to Miss Dorothy 
Hughes on account -0f that stock which you borrowed Y 
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. A. Not a penny,, with the exception of what was paid from 
the City of Lynchburg for four months salary. 
Q. How much was that T 
A. $915.00, and some cents. 
Q. That amount has been repaid her7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Out of the aesignment 7 
A. That is right. 
. Q. Mr. Hughes, after you were appointed as 
page 51 ~ City Assessor did you execute an assignment to 
Miss Dorothy Hughes of your compensation from 
the City? 
A. I did. I promised to return the siock or pay for it and 
that was the understanding, so in order to pay what I coulcl 
I made an assignment and filed it with the Comptroller of 
the City of Lynchburg, assigning to her my salary for the 
year 1942, and my daughter, Dorothy Huoohes, made that 
assignment payable to the Peoples NationalBank of Lynch-
burg to be applied on this note for which she had bought back 
this stock which I owed her for. 
Q.· And- she reassigned: it to the Peoples National Bank? 
A. That is right. 
By Mr. Caskie: ( addressing the Court) I want to read 
into the record the assignment as set out in the Answer and 
which is admitted by Counsel. 
By the Court: Do counsel for the defendant stipulate that 
that is the asf.lignment and tha.t it may be read into the record 
in lieu of the original Y 
By Mr. Rosenberger.: That is right. 
By Mr. Caskie: The assignment is as follows : 
''November 27, 1941. 
'' To the City of Lynchburg. 
'' For value received I hereby assign and trans-
page 52 ~ fer to Dorothy Hughes my salary as assessor of 
real estate for the year 1942, amounting to 
$2,750.00, payable in monthly installments beginning Febru-
ary 1, 1942, to be applied by the said Dorothy Hughes on ac-
count of my indebtedness to her. 
''Given under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
B. E. HUGHES" 
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The further assignment is as follows: 
"I hereby direct the City of Lynchburg to pay the monthly 
installments of the above assig·nment to the Peoples National 
Bank of Lynchburg, to be applied by it to the payment of 
my collateral note held by said Bank. 
''Given under my hand this 29th day of November, 1941. 
''DOROTHY HUGHES.'' 
Q. Mr. Hughes, those are the assignments to which you 
refer! 
A. ·That is right. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, is your daughter employed Y 
A. She has been teaching· at the College for a good many 
years. 
Q. What College? 
A. Randolph-Macon Woman's College. 
Q. She earns her own livingY 
page 53 ~ A. She does. 
Q. You know how many years she has been 
teaching there Y 
A. On a guess, about sixteen or eighteen years. 
Q. I believe you were appointed assessor in the fall of 
1941. 
A. I was. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, has it ever been at any time suggested be-
tween you and Miss Dorothy Hughes tha~ she was giving you 
her stock? 
A. Never. I never asked her to give me any stock or any-
thing of the kind. At the time I borrowed it from her it was 
with the full expectation and her full expectation of me pay-
ing it back, which I would have done if conditions had con-
tinued as tllev were. 
Q. You were wiped out in the course of the depression? 
A. Practically wiped out. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. Mr. Hughes, as I understand it, this stock is placed in 
the name of Miss Dorothy Hughes. The certificates were 
issued in her name in 1934, June of that year, is that cor-
rect! 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. ·when did she endorse them in blank, Mr. Hughes? 
A. M v recollection is it was in '35 or '36. I don't remem-
ber just the date tllat I borrowed them from her. That was 
the time she endorsed them. · 
page 54 ~ Q. You don't remember whether you borrowed 
them from her in '35 or '36? 
.A. I don't remember. 
Q. That refers to this $4,500.00 collateral, doesn't iU 
A. Tha.t is rig-ht. 
Q. Had you borrowed any from her before that time? 
A. I hadn't borrowed any stock. I borrowed some money 
from her before that time. 
Q. ·when was that borrowed? 
A. Sometime before tha.t. I borrowed money and gave her 
notes for the money. 
Q. You gave her notes for the money Y 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. You remember the time of that? 
A. I don't remember the dates exactly, but I did it. 
Q. At the time you borrowed the stocks from her in 1935 
or 1'936 how much money did you owe the Peoples National 
Bankf 
A. I owed fullv twice as much as this. I don't remember 
exactly but it wa; a good deal more than this. 
Q. Did you owe them in the neighborhood of $30,000.00Y 
A. No. As maker and endorser it may have run up to 
something of that sort. 
Q. As maker and endorser-that is, primarily and con-
tinp:entl:v linble it was in the neig·hborhood of about $30,000.00 
to $36,000.00? 
A. No, not $36,000.00. I don't remember just 
page 55 ~ the amount. 
Q. Wl1at would you estimate it, Mr. Hughes? 
A. Anywhere from twenty to twenty-five thousand dollars, 
maker and endorser. 
Q. Anywhere from twenty-five to thirty thousand dollars 
as maker and endorser. Miss Dorothy Hughes knew that, 
clidn 't she Y 
A. I don't know as she did. I asked her to loan me some 
money and she did it. She wa.s trying· to help me. 
Q. At the time you got the stocks from her how much did 
you owe the First National BankT 
Bv Mr. Caskie: (interposing) I object to that. I don't 
St!e why he is going into all of his financial affairs. 
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By Mr. Rosepberger: I think I h~ve a right to go into the 
circnnistances. · · · ~ · · · · · '· 
·By th·e Court: I don't see why the fµll amount of his in-
debtedness has anything 'to, do ·whatever with 'this particular 
transaction. If you assure the Court that it is relevant and 
that it will appear from your-testimony that ·it js you may 
proGeed, but in. the absence of a showing from you to that 
effect I will sustain the objection~ , · · 
By· Mr. Rosenberger : I offer this to show if there was any 
reasonable expectations between the parties that 
page 56 ~ he would return the stocks or pay for them. His 
financial condition would certainlv enter into that. 
By Mr. Caskie: Re said his daughter didn't know about 
this. · · 
By Mr. Rosenberger: As to the Peoples Bank she didn't 
know. 
By Mr. Caskie: If she didn't know his indebtedness how 
can it ma.k~ any difference? 
By the Court: I will sustain the objection for the present. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Then I would like to ask that the 
jury retire in order that I may get it into the record what 
his answer would be. 
Note: (The j-q.ry retires from the courtroom and -the fol-
lowing examination of the witness is while the jury is ab-
sent.) · 
~Y the Court: Mr. E,osenb~rger, as the court sees it, you 
are involving not only what his indebtedness is but to prop-
erly portray the picture yqu ha-ye back in your mind you 
have to show or he!would have to show all of his assets, every-
thing he har1, and then his present worth, possible potential 
future w~rth, tq ··g·et in whether in his mind he thought he 
would ever work himself out again. Hope springs 
page ~7 ~ eternally in t~e ~nunan preas~, and however pitiful, 
110,v c~ yo-q. sho~v th~t he did not expect with tbe 
turn of the tide to be able to pay out, and your qµestion hi:-
volves not merely wpat the· ·amo-qnt of his indebtedness was 
but by like token the jury ··should be given the berie:fit of all 
of the. assets that he had of every nature and, frankly, I do 
not think thaf your evidence ·you are aeeking to introduce is 
admissible at all; but if you by your evidence can couple· up 
someth~.ng further tlum you indicated I then would let it in, 
bnt for the pre~ent I sustain the objection. ~ · 
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By Mr. Rosehperg~r: I hate to make an avowal to tl1e 
court that I'c~m· tie if up.·· I expect to'but i don't want to 
avow that rca:µ tie it ·up. . . 
· By Mr. Caskie: I 'might mention this further objection. 
Rep:ar_dle~s of what his situation wa·s a person has a perfect 
rig·ht to lend' their assets or money to anybody they please, 
relying on the1h pe:,isonally, whether they have any assets 
or" not; ancl tbe fact the ·person didn't expect tQ pay it bacJr 
doe"sn 't keep the deqt from existing. The debt still exists. 
I can lend to an insolvent man arid he still owes me and 
whether he expects to pay me. or whether I expect him to pay 
doesn't matter. 
page 58 } By· the Court: I think that position is sound, 
and ~ the absence of the jury, if I underst~nd 
what ii;} b~ing· sought here' is whether at the time that Miss 
Dorothy Hughes' parted wit11 her· stock to her father there 
W~S or wast ·not 'iiµy ·understanding that she W8$ making 'him 
a p1·esent qf it ··. · · · · ·.. · 
· By Mr. Caskie: That is all, whether she ~xpected him to 
pay it back is immaterial. · ·· · 1 · 
By Mr. Rosenberger: And whether they entered into a 
chlontfr~c~t~?,et11er ~~: was tq· retr~r~ the stoek to her or pay 
er or 1 • 
. Bf'the' Court: That ia the reverse of what I said. You 
are 'entitled ''to put iii the. record what· this witness would 
aiiswer 'to your question, so you may do that. . . 
. 13v Mr. Rosenb-erger: · I will ask him about that now. 
_ •. • 1 I • , ~-._ ' • 
Q. l\fr. Flugbes, th~ question was _how much did you owe 
the· First Natforial Bank at the time you got the stocks from 
your daughter? 
· A. I owed them as maker and endorser considerably over 
$50,000.00,· is my· recpll~ction. · · · 
·Q. Wott1d >1ou estimate that to be around $80,000.00? 
A. As maker and endorser? I have ·the figures at home. 
If I had known it was coming in here I could have 
page 59 r broug;ht them. 
· · : · Q~ Did Miss Dorothy Hughes know you _owed 
th~ First National Bank in the neighborhood of fifty to eighty 
thousand dollars Y 
· A'. She didn't know a thin~ about it. 
Q. Is that as to the amount? 
A. I don 'f know as she knew I owed them anything. l 
didn't discuss the matter with her and she didn't ask me. I 
borrowed the stock from her and borrowed money from her 
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to use, fully expecting to pay it back, or I would not have 
borrowed it. Had my values continued as it was there were 
plenty of assets to pay out what I owed, according to my 
idea at that time. I thought so then and still think so, if it 
had been handled properly. 
Q. How much did you owe the Depositors Industrial Loan 
Bank at the time vou obtained these c.ertificates? . 
A. They had my paper there for $11,000.00 is my recollec-
tion, about that time. Collateral was sold-part of the prop-
erty was sold and brought it dovm to $4,500.00. 
Q. Now, did you have any other outstanding indebtedness 
at the time that vou obtained these certificates Y 
A. I expect I dicl. I don't remember now. 
Q. Approximately what was iU 
A. I owed the Lynchburg Trust and Savings Bank about 
$5,000.00. For that I borrowed 36 shares of First National 
Bank stock from my daughter and put it up as additional 
collateral. That stock was sold last October for 
page 60 ~ $138.00 a share so I still owe her that 36 shares of 
stock. 
. By Mr. Rosenberger: I think they are all of the answers 
I want while the jury is out but I do want to state on the 
record that the defendant Minnie E. Knight, by counsel, ob-
jects and excepts to the ruling· of the court in refusing io 
admit this evidence for the reason that the jury have a right 
to know all of the attending facts and circumstances in order 
to arrive at whether or not a binding legal contract was en-
tered into between B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes at 
the time be obtained the collateral mentioned in this proceed-
ing. 
By the Court: The court adheres to its former ruling until 
you show that there was something in those cirS!umsta.nces 
that made Mr. Hughes aware of the fac.t that he would likely 
be umlhle to repa)r., to meet his obligation. If vou can show 
that tllen I think your point will be well taken and I will ad-
mit it. 
By Mr. Caskie: -W onldn 't he have to go further and show 
that Miss Dorothv Hrnrhes knew iU 
Bv the Court: .. If IiJe can show the conditions were such 
., that Mr. B. E. Hughes never expected to pay his 
page 61 ~ daughter or return tl1e stock I would admit it. If 
he can show that as quoad Miss Dorothy Hughes 
is something else> but if be can show that the circumstances 
were ~uch that Mr. B. E. Hughes never expected to return 
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that stock or repay his daughter I think I would let him 
do it. 
Note! (The jury return into the courtroom and this pro-
ceeding is continued in the pre~ence, of the jnry.) 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. l\f r. Hugl1es, at the time you obtained the collateral from 
Miss Dorothy Hughes about which we are speaking was she 
living in the house with you 1 
.A. She was. · 
Q. Both living together. ,v as anyone living with you ex-
cept Miss Dorothy Hug·hes? 
A. No one was living there with us. Part of the time we 
had n boarder. 
Q. I understood you to say she was trying to help you out 
when she lent you the collateral. 
A. I nsked her to loan it to me to help me in financial 
trouble. 
Q. Did you tell lier you lrnd :financial troubles f 
A. I told her that I ne~ded some money. 
Q. You needed ~ome money f 
A. YeR, sir. 
page 62 ~ Q. Did you . tell her why you i1eeded some 
monev? 
A. I don't thii1k I did. She didn't ask me. 
Q. ,vhen you, said you needed some money did you tell her 
that if you clicl not get additional collateral that the banks 
would sell what collateral that they had of yours f 
A. I did not. 
Q. In other words, you g·ave no definite reason why you 
needed the money but merely said that you did need some 
monevf 
A. °I needed the money and wouldn't have borrowed the 
stock or anything; from her if I hadn't fully expected at the 
time to repay jt and I considered my assets ample at the 
time to pay what I owed. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, what did your assets consist of princi-
pally? ·· · 
By Mr. Caskie: (interpoAing) I object to that, your Honor. 
By the Court: ,v11at is t]1e basis· of your objection? 
By Mr. Caskie: l\f y objection is that they are trying to 
g·o on a fishing expedition to find out everything and any-
thing. · It will only confuse the jury and it is irrelevant. The 
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only question before the jury is whether there was valid con-· 
Rideration for that assignment at the time and to go into all 
this has nothing to do with the case. 
page 63 ~ · By the Court: I fail offhand. to see_ any rele-
vancy or pertmency to the question. 
By Mr. Rosenberger : I am leading up to this point to 
show, to ascertain whether or not the assets depreciated prior 
to '35 and '36 or whether there was a depreciation in his 
assets after '35 or '36. 
By the Court: What difference does it make? 
By Mr. Rosenberg·er: It makes this difference: If at the 
time he got this collateral he was insolvent then that raises 
a question as to whether or not he reasonably expected and 
intended to return the property which he was g·etting from 
Dorothv Hughes. 
By the Court: I don't think his solvency at the time is 
any test one way or the other, as. I see it. An insolvent man 
may borrow money with the full expectation to become 
solvent .through the use of that very money. The objection 
is sustained. . 
By Mr. Rosenberger: At the same time-if I might and 
the court would indulge me-we are interested here as to 
the bona fides of a contract made .in '35 or '36. The time is 
not stated definitely. Now, in order to give this 
pag·c 64 } jury the information tha.t it-
By the Court: (interposing) One moment, if 
you want to ref er to the jury it would be bes.t for the jury to 
retire. T overruled your objection. I thoug·ht you understood 
,that. Now you want to pursue the inquiry further. If you 
have any new light you want to give I will let the jury retire 
and you may do so. 
Bv Mr. Rosenberger : : I thought if your Honor would 
permit me I would make myself clear. 
By the Court: Yes, sir, but I do not care for you to b~ . 
arguing before the jury. The jury will please retire. 
Note: (The jury retires from the courtroom.) 
By the. Court: Mr. Rosenb~rg~r, I thought I gave you an 
oppnrhm1tv to make vour obJectiom; to the rulin~ of the 
court in the absence of the jury and then after the jurv come~ 
back you undertake to introduce further testimony that the 
court had ruled would not be admitted. The court verv 
hoartily disapproves of that type of procedure. Hereafte·i· 
when ~·ou make your objections you make your full objection 
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before the jury returns to the courtroom because there is a 
· decided influence or pervasion going over to a jury 
page 65 } when yon argue to the court th3:t you are doing 
so and so in order that the jury may understand 
so and so. Now don't repeat that. Give your objections to 
the court while the jury is out and give them completely and 
in full. Now, if you failed to state anything in your first 
objections the court will now hear you on those., but don't 
repeat that. Don't let the jury come back and then under-
take to add objections in the presence of the jury that should 
have been covered while they were out. I will hear any fur-
ther objections on this particular point. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: With deference to the court, it is 
my judgment that the objection was made that we should 
not go i:rito the insolvency of Mr. Hughes at the first occasion; 
that the amount of money that he owed had nothing to do 
with the matter. Now, on the other hand I want to intro-
duce the kind and value or bring before the jury the kind and 
value of the assets that he owed ou in order to let them de-
termine whether or not he reasonably expected and did in-
tend at the time he got the eoila.teral to return it or pay for it; 
that it is ·our opinion that when he got this collateral he was 
insolvent; that he was sinking and he was getting 
pnge 66 } whatever assets he could to try to turn the tide; 
that neither he nor his daughter entered into a 
binding legal contract' whereby he was to be obligated to her 
and to repay her in all events but she was doing a favor to 
a father who was going down financially. Now, that is my 
pur1-,ose and I think the court will judicially take knowledge 
of the fact that real estate values depreciated more in '32, 
133 and '34 than they did in '35, '36 and '37, and my purpose 
in asking the kind of assets was to determine whether or not 
most of his assets did not consist of real estate. Now, I don't 
mean to be arguing to the oourt and before the jury to get 
any wrong impressions on the jury and none of that was in 
my intentions but I do want to state my gTonnds fully to 
the court so the court will understand what I am attempting 
to do. · · 
By the Court: If I catch you, you are trying to show that. 
·rwn constat the witness' statement that there was no gift of 
the stock to him but by going into the question of w~at his 
entire iudebtedness was, what his entire assets were, ·you 
hope to prove that he was insolvent, is that right? 
·By l\{r. ]losenberger: Yes, sir. 
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By the Court: And the solvency being gauged· 
page 67 ~ purely by the valuation put upon his assets? · 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I want to go fur~her than 
that. Not the question solely of his insolvency but that in-
solvency is nn indication that he did not intend to repay un-
less the v-alues of llis assets later crune up. 
By th~ C0urt: Now, you may ask him that question if you 
wish, hnt. are you prepared to show what all of his assets 
were worth fairhr at that time¥ 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I am going to have to depend on 
him to tell me. I can't tell the court I can show it any other 
wav. 
By the Court: Have yon a.ny evidence~ Mr. Rosenberger, 
to support the point you are making except such as you may 
hopP. to elicit from tllis witness 1 
By Mr. Rosenberger: That evidence is entirely within 
what ·he tells me. I haYe no outside evidence and he himself 
is the only one that I know knows his financial condition and 
in matters of that kind I will have to depend entirely on 
him. 
By the Court: Has .not the witness stated that at the time 
he borrowed this collateral, and going back ahead of that, 
at the time he borrowed some money, that he re-
page 68 ~ garded bis assets as ample security and that he 
would be able to pay her back or otherwise he 
would never ban~ borrowed tl1e money from his daughter or 
borrowed t.he stock? Hasn't he stated that! 
By Mr. Rosenberg·er: He stated that but I say that is for 
the jury to determine and that is a question in issue here to-
dav and not for :M:J.·. Hughes. 
By the Court: But in the last analysis, you say you are 
depending on Mr. Hug-hes to give you the information. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Give me all of the facts and not his 
conclusions. ·when he makes a. statement that there was no 
gift ht:~tween him and hiR daughter and tI1at l1e intended to 
repay I sav that that is a conclusion and that is what the 
jury;8 func'tion is in this case. 
Bv the Court: ::M:r. Rosenberger, it would be but a con-
clusion for him to put bis value on hiR assets. That is bui 
·his conclusion. 
By J\f 1·. Rosenbcrg·er: .Just 0f a. different type. 
By the Court: I simply think tl1at all of that, in the light 
of wl1at you eh1te and what you have, is wholly 
page 69 ~ irrelevant and I so rule. I was first disposed to 
think if you lmd some evidence to support that 
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that I mig·ht change the ruling bnt seeing that you are un-
dertaking to g·et at the sume thing that he stated directly 
by a circuitom; way, which aft.er all leads you simply to adopt 
bis own evaluation of his own estate, so we would be running 
fa a circle, so the objection is sustained. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: The ruling of the court I understand 
is that I not only cannot find out the assets he owned as of 
the time he obtained this collateral but that his financial con-
dition as of that time has no bearing? 
Bv the Court: I don't want vou to misunderstand this. I 
sustain the objection to the question that was asked. I go 
further and tel1 you that !\fr. Hughes hus stated he does not 
know the exnct amount of his indebtedness; that generally 
~penking he regarded his assets at the tim~ of this transac-
tion to be sufficient to nnable him to have met all of his obli-
gations and pay bark the money or stock. that he borrowed 
and that is enomxh. He cannot be intP-rrogated anv further. 
By Mr. Rosen1;·erger: I migl1t ask the court before calling 
the jnry baek, in order t]mt I might not be in con-
page 70 ~ tempt of court, if .it is now proper that I ask the 
. witness wlmt property or assets he disposed of 
and w11at went l\~ith the money that those assf'ts brought in,-
the proceeds of the mom:)y 0/ 
By the Court: Dispos~d of when, Mr. Rosenberger? 
By Mr. Rosenberg:cr: J~,rom UJ35 nntil the present time., as 
showing- an opportunity for him to repay the obligation if 
one e"'<i~teil to hi~ dang-htC\r. 
By tl)~ Court: . I d~n 't see tbnt at a 11. I would not permit 
that question to he asked. Now if yon want to put in the 
record what bis answer would be, and I want you to reserve 
your exceptions, you are at lil1erty to do so in the ahslmce 
of the iur:r;r. 
By Mr. Rosenberg·er: I will ask him. 
Q. Mr. Hug·hcs, vour assets consisted principally of real 
estate. did thev not? 
A. Laqrnly i·N1I estate, yes, sir. 
Q. And what else? 
Hy Mr. Caskie: I object to this. 
By the Co11rt: He is putting- in the record what the wit-
ness' answer would be to the question that I ex-
pnge 71 ~ elriclcd and be haR a rip;ht to do that. 
By Mr. Caskie: You are right. 
72 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
B. E. Hughes. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
0 Q. Mr. Hughes, yon may answer the question. 
' I 
A. Largely real estate. I had several equities in my col-
laterals in the bank but they dwindled. 
Q. Getting back to the type of assets, you say they con-
sisted largelv of real estateY 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have any other assets Y 
A. Second mortgages in the bank~ 
Q. Mortgage8 secured by notes-notes secured by second 
mortgages? 
A. First and second mortgages and they were foreclosed 
by the Industrial Savings Bank. I owed them $11,000.00. 
The bank foreclosed on a lot of that property and paid it 
down to $4,500.00 in the year 1938. If they had been left 
nloue there were ample assets to pav in full. That wasn't 
money I borrowed but simply obligations where I put my 
note up for different loans that had been made and if that 
had been properlv handled there wouldn't have been a dollar 
left owing. Take the First National Ban~, they had a loru.t 
of $30,000.00 on Edgewood },arm which cost me over $60,-
000.00. "\"\tnen they put it up and sold the farm what did they 
let.,· eight or ten thousand dollars for it. 
Q. Wbat was your obligation to the First Na-
page 72 ~ tional Bank on account of the Edgewood Farm 
loan about ·which you speak? 
A. My recollection is the deed of trust was for $30,000.00, 
securecl bv deed of trust on Edsrewood Fa.rm. and thev hacl 
deeds of fru~t on eight or ten other pieces of property and 
when tl1ese thingos were foreclosed and sold at a sacrifice 
wh':r my assets were wiped out, still leaving me owing money. 
Q. Weren't most of the foreclosures on the second deeds 
of trust pri0r to 1935 f 
A. They liaye h(len running up until last year. 
Q. When did they begin? 
lL My wl1ole trouble began in the year 1938 when your 
firm brought a suit on this very cla.im there for worthless 
stock. 
Q. Didn't your troubles begin prior to then Y 
A. I was hard up and n~eded money but that was the first 
suit that was started. 
Q. That was the first time you were sued but as far back 
as '35 ,ou were called by the ·banks for collateral. · 
A. They were still callin~ for collateral because values 
were dropping off. The First National Bank sold as high 
...... 
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as $300.00 and it got down to what Y Other stocks were the 
same way, so that the values were simply wiped out. Crad-
dock-Terry wasn't worth anything hardly. All values went 
down that way, but I considered when I borrowed money and 
borrowed stock from my daughter, I considered 
page 73 ~ myself solvent up to the time in 1938 when these 
suits started and the collateral and my assets, if 
they had been handled properly, I believe they would have 
paid out. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, you defaulted on the interest on the obli-
gation of Mrs. Knight on November 22nd, 1937, and that was 
the same obligation on which she later obtained judgment, 
was it not? 
A. I don't recall when I paid. the interest on it last. That 
was a note P. A. Krise's estate held for some stocks which 
I considered worthless but it was. a legal obligation. I didn't 
consider it a moral obligation at all but I tried to pay it and 
would have paid it if-as I told you all when you started tho 
Ruit that you were going to force me into trouble. 
Q. You did pay a considerable amount on the obligation. 
.A. I did. 
Bv the Court: Is that relevant to this issue at all? 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Just following up. 
By the Court: I don't think that is responsive to the ques-
tion that you submitted to the court, Mr. Rosenberger., that 
you wanted to get into the record from this witness. I ex-
tended you the privilege to get his answers to those questions 
in the record. 
page 74} By Mr. Rosenberger: I am trying to do that. 
Bv the Court: You are wandering so far afield. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I admit that his answers have got 
me off from the point. 
Q. Mr. Bug·hcs, what assets have you disposed of since 
1935 and 19H6 to the present time Y 
A. I lmven 't disposed of any since 1938 because the judg-
ments wHre against my properties. My assets were froz~n 
from the time this judgment was r.endered. The banks have 
sold collateral The banks have foreclosed on different deeds 
of trust m1<1 things of that kind have been going right along. 
Q. Now, tl1e point I am driving at, Mr. Hughes, since the 
time that you got these stock c.erti:ficates from your da}1gh-
ter, Miss Dorothy IIughes, what properties have you sold, 
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that belong·ed to you at the time you got the certificates, that 
you received any money from 1 
A. I don't recall anv. 
Q. You don't recall· that you sold any Y 
A. I sold to her, in payment of the money I borrowed and 
notes which she held, the 200 acres of land on which she is 
living. I paid $1,600.00 for it at auction. 
By Mr. Rosenberger : ( addressing the court) I think, your 
Honor, that is prope1· to be brought out for the 
page 75 ~ jury. 
By the ·witness: I paid $1.,600.00 for it at auc-
tion-
By Mr. Rosenberger: (interposing) 
Q. Let me interrupt you .. Other than what you have given 
or turned over to !fiss Dorothy Hughes in the way of your 
assets what assets of yours have you sold since 1935 to date 
to third parties 1 · 
A. I don't recall and can't recall any. Whatever it was 
went to pay on debts that were owing and interest that was 
owing, and so forth, because I had so many obligations. 
Q. In other words, the only assets of yours that have been 
sold from the year 1935 to date were whaU 
A. I couldn't say from '35 because I was trading every 
year, '35, '36, '37 and '38. I was trading and going on in 
my place of business, but in late '38 when you brought that 
suit you.froze my real estate so that part was tied up. 
Q. Now, my point is, what real estate of yours that you 
owned in 1935 did you sell to third persons other than Miss 
Dorothy Hughes Y 
A. I would have to go into the records to answer that ques-
tion. I am satisfied there were different people. 
Q. Can you estimate the money, the proceeds of those sales 
to third parties ? 
A. I cannot. 
Q. Did you pay any of that to Miss Dorothy Hughes Y 
A. Not a dollar. 
page 76 r Note: (The jury returns into the courtroom and 
the following examination is in the presence of the 
jury.) 
By Mr. R.osenberger: 
Q. Mr. Hughes, from the time you g·ot this stock from Miss 
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Dorothy Hughes, during either the year 1935 or 1936, until 
the year 1940 did you repay Miss Dorothy Hughes anything 
on account of these stocks? · 
A. Not a penny. . 
Q. In the fall of 1941 or during the month of November 
or December of that year, and just prior to the time you 
were sued by Mrs. Minnie E. Knight, did you convey any 
property to Miss Dorothy Hughes¥ 
A. I did. 
Q. vVhat¥ 
A. I conveyed her that place in which she is now living. 
Q. What is the name of it 7 
A. ·we call it ''Cherry Hill Farm". I bought it at auc-
tion. 
Q. Where is that located? 
A. About halfway between here and Altavista. 
Q. In Campbell County? 
A. Seneca District, Campbell County. 
Q. How many acres? 
A. 200 acres. 
Q. Any improvements? 
A. A house, two stables, two tobacco barns. 
page 77 ~ Q. Is not that place an old estate? 
A. It is an old place. It was sold in a chancery 
suit by Robert A. Russell, Qommissioner, and I bought it 
from him at public auction for $1,600.00, payable 10% cash 
and executed five bonds for the fourteen hundred . and some 
dollars balance. 
Q. When did you buy it? 
A. Bought it about '35 or '36, and that was standing two 
years before I got a deed to it and 'the next day I deeded it 
to my daughter. I paid out some $700.00 and conveyed it 
to her and she paid the balance. 
Q. When did you convey it to her f 
A. Conveyed it to her . in 1938 is my recollection. 
Q. Wasn't that in December just prior to Mrs. Knight's 
judgment? 
A. I have got the deeds in my car out here. I can get 
them and tell you exactly. I deeded it for the consideration 
of $1,000.00, which was more than I had paid on it. She 
paid the balance. 
Q. It ha.s situated on it an old house which has been com-
pletely remodelled and it is up-to-date. 
A. It has been repainted and papered but it hasn't bet-11 
remodelled. 
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Q. It has modern conveniences. 
A. She spent all the money spent on it. I didn't do it. 
Q. Wasn't that done prior to the time you con--
page 78 } veyed it to her? 
A. It was not.. When we nioved out there a 
good deal hadn't . been done. It was all papered afte1· we 
moved the1·e. 
Q. What do you estimate the value of that property fo be 
as of the time you conveyed it to her? 
A. It was worth what I paid for it at public auction. 
Q . .A.s a matter of fact isn't the :property worth approxi-
mately ten or twelve thousand dollars Y 
A. It is not. 
Q. In December, the same month in which Mrs. Knight ob-
tained judgment against you-that is, in Decembert 1938,---
you also confessed judgment in favor of Peoples National 
Bank, did you not f 
A. I did. 
Q. 'What' was that in the amount oft 
A. $8,000.00. 
Q. You also on the same date confessed judgment in favor 
of the First National Bank, did you not Y 
By Mr. Caskie: (interposing) 1 object, your Honor, please. 
I don't see any use in going i}!to this. 
By the Court: What is the basis of your objection f 
By Mr. Casltle: His being· sued and confessing judgment 
in favor of other people is immaterial in this pto-
page 79 } ceecling. 
By the Court: I fail to see the relevancy of it. 
By Mr. Rosenberg·er: Our point is this: .At the 1i.me lie 
confessed judgment, and about that time, he conveJ"ed this 
property to Miss Dorothy Hughes and we say that if that 
was for value received he could well have paid it cm these 
two judgments which he confessed. 
By the Court: That doesn't make any difference. He can 
select what creditors he wishes to pay so I don't see the 
pertinency of it. 
By_Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. Mr. Hughes, in November of 1938, and just prior to 
the· time ~rs. Knight obtained her judgment, what other 
property did you convey to Miss· Dorothy Hughes 7 
A. Five little pieces of property, £our at a valuation of 
$370.00-you can have them today at that-and one piece at 
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the valuation of $190 .. 00 that cost $150.00, and the balance, 
the $1,000.00 for the homeplace. The $870.00 £or the four 
little pieces of land, and the $190.00, and sold her two mules, 
some farming equipment and sotne cows, for the $2,000.00 note 
whfoh she had of mine at the time. 
By the Court: 
Q. Let rue understand that. You made certain payments 
to your daughter either by conveying lands or per-
page 80 } sonal property in payment of what Y 
A. On payment of three notes I owed her for 
$2,000.00 which she loaned me before that time. It was for 
money she had loaned me. 
Q. Prior to borrowing or getting from. her this stock which 
was put Up· as collateral you had borrowed cash from her t . 
A. Cash, and my notes were executed for $2,000.00, and 
which I owed het\ 
Q. And you made certain payments on the notes you gave 
her for the $2,000.00 preceding this transaction Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you maltt! any payment to Miss Dorothy Hughes 
on the transaction relating to this stock t 
· A. Not a. dollar, not a penny; only on money I borrow~d. 
By Mr. CaskiQ : The stocks never had been sold until long 
after that. 
By the Court~ It is a little confusing to me as to what 
he was paying when he deeded that Campbell County prop-
erty nnd those other liUl~ pieces of real estate. 
By the Witness: Thete were three notes, $1,200.00, $500.00 
and $300.00. 
By the Court: 
Q. Was this transaction here as to the stock involved in 
that? 
A. That had nothing to do with this. I owe her 
page 81 ~ this $4,500.00 and the 36 shares of s.tock. Hasn't 
been one penny paid on that. 
]Jy Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. In response to the court's question I understood you 
to say you paid ·her what you owed her on a former trans-
action by conveying these five pieces of real estate and cer-
tain personal property to her. 
~~ 'J;h~t is ri$'ht. 
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Q. None of this was in payment for the stock which you 
had gotten from her? 
A. Not a penny has been paid on that stock or the other 
stock that I borrowed from her. 
Q. The previous indebtedness was evidenced by a note t 
A. Three notes, $1,200.00, $500.00 and $300.00. 
Q. Was this indebtedness evidenced by any note f 
A. I owed her for the stock and was to pay her for it or 
return it. 
Q. What did you tell her you would pay for it if you didn't 
return it? 
A. Didn't tell her anything. The value of it at that time 
was fixed by the bank. 
Q. Did you tell her when you were going to return the 
stock! 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did she ask you when you were going to return the 
stock! 
A. She did not. 
page 82 ~ Q. In other words, she just handed you the stock 
and you said, ''Thank you, I will get it back to you 
or pay you for it". 
A. I didn't say anything of the kind. I asked her to loan 
me the stock and handed her the certificates and she signed 
them. I expected to return them to her and I considered my 
assets ample at the time to do it. 
Q. You said, '' Here are the stock certificates, you endorse 
them and loan them to me''. 
A. '' Loan me this stock.'' And if I hadn't expected to re-
turn it or pay for it I wouldn't have borrowed· it. 
Q. But you did not agree to any definite amount nor did 
you sign a note l 
A. Not for the stock. 
Q. This is the stock on which you base the consideration 
for that salary assig·nment from the City of Lynchburg, is 
it notf · 
A. That is the stock right here. 
Q. And that is the $4,500.00 that you say you owe her 
and that is the consideration for that salary assig'Ilment to 
the City? 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. You also were assessor for the City of Lynchburg in 
'38, were you not? · 
A. That is right. 
Q. At that time how much salary did you receive! 
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A. About the same. I don't recall the exact 
page 83 r amount but about the same I did in '42, a differ-
ence probably of $250.00. 
Q. How was that salary paid to you in 19381 
A. In monthly payments. 
Q. At that time did you give Miss Dorothy Hughes any 
of that salary? 
A. Not a penny. That money went to pay the interest 
on the .obligations at the two banks. 
Q. You did not confess a judgment in her favor for the 
$4,500.001 
A. I did not. I owed it to her. 
Q. Didn't you give her a car in 1938, Mr. Hughes? 
A. I did not. I bought a car and traded in the old one 
and she put up the money for the difference. 
Q. You traded in your old cart 
A. It was her old car and the new car was hers. She paid 
the difference of $600.00, I think it was. 
Q. What was the date that Mrs. Knight's indebtedness was 
incurred by you 1 \Vhen did that indebtedness arise as be-
tween you and Mrs. Knight¥ 
A. It came out of the estate of P. A. Krise, some worth-
less stock P. A. Krise had. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: (addressing the court) We ask that 
the words '' worthless stock'' be stricken. 
By the Witness: I gave my collateral. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. What was the date? 
page 84 ~ A. I don't remember the date. It was way back 
yonder iu the Twenties. 
By 1\fr. Rosenberger: ( addressing the court) We ask the 
court to instruct the jury that they a.re not to consider the 
consideration for the indebtedness to Mrs. Knight. 
By the Court: ( addressing· the jury) The consideration, 
of any debt owed by Mr. Hughes to Mrs. Knight is imma-
terial. You are to disregard what the foundation of any 
such debt was. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. Mr. ·Hughes, can you tell me definitely whether it was 
in the year 1935 or 1936 that you got these $4,500.00 worth 
of certificates 1 
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A. I can't tell you definitely. I would have to go to the 
Peoples National Bank's books to find out. · 
. Q. Could you tell me the value of them as of the time you 
got themY 
A. At the time I got them from her the First National 
B~nk stock was worth $150.00 a share and the other two stood 
at par like they do now, althoug·h some of that loft building 
stock sold as low as $70.00 a share. 
Q. So whether that was high or low at that time you. don't 
know?· · 
A. That was low. The stock was paying 7°10. 
page 85 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie : 
Q. Mr. Hughes, I believe you stated at the time you bor-
. rowed this stock from Miss Dorothy Hughes in 1935 or 1936, 
at that time you fully expected to be able to work your situa-
tion out and pay her back. 
A. I fully expected to do it. I wouldn't have borrowed 
it if I hadn't expected to be able to do it. It would have 
been useless to borrow it to put it in a rat hole. I consid-
ered my assets ample, if properly handled, to pay off my 
obligations and I wo.uld not have borrowed the stock other-
wise. 
Q. This property that you conveyed to her, the farm in 
Campbell County and other pieces of real and personal prop-
erty, that was for some notes you owed her for money you 
had borrowed from her? 
A. Three notes for money I borrowed. 
Q. Prior to this stock transaction 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a matter of fact, until 1939 the stock was still there 
in the bank, wasn't it? · 
A. The stock was in the bank. I had been unable to sell 
property or to take up the note-. 
Q. -1=\.nd it was in '39 she had to buy this stock back? 
A. Yes, sir, or the hank would have sold the stock and 
wiped out my obligations and it was arranged with the bank 
that she would buy $6,800.00 worth of collateral, among which 
was $4,500.00 worth of stock I owed her for. 
page 86 ~ Q. Do you lmow if she still owes the bank on 
the note? 
A. Owes $6,568.00 now. 
;' 
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By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. She has never had the collateral which she bought from 
the bank, the $6,800.00 worth of collateral Y 
A. The bank has got the collateral. 
Q. They transferred it to her when she gave them her 
$6,800.00 note? 
. A. That is right. 
Q. And she, in effect, bought it from the bank Y 
A. She bought it from the bank for $6,800.00 and still 
owes on that $6,568.00. 
Q. Did you ever pay her any interest on the money that 
these stocks represented from the time you borrowed them 
in '35 or '367 
A. Not a penny. All of the money that came in was ap-
plied to the indebtedness in the bank. 
Q. How about your dividends from the collateral, where 
was that going Y 
A. Went to pay interest on the obligations in the bank. 
Q. In other words, she did not receive the dividends from 
the stocks either Y 
A. No. 
Q. They went on to the bank? 
.A. They went on to the bank. . 
Q. That was from 1935 or 1936 up to date? 
A. All of the time. 
page 87 ~ By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Did the bank require that the dividends 
should apply? 
A. At one time that was the agreement that the dividends 
would apply on the not~. 
Q. That agreement was between you and the bank? 
A. Between me and the bank or between my daughter and 
the bank. 
Q. It was between your daughter and the bank after she 
bought the stock from the bank, is that right? 
· A. That is right. 
Q. Before she bought the stock from the bank the agree-
ment was as between you and the bank. It was your col-
lateral. 
A. That is right. 
Q. Then did she agree that the dividends of that stock 
would go on your interest Y 
A. She would always hand the cheeks to me after she had 
endorsed them. · 
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Q. You really owe her for those dividends too then .. 
A. That is right. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: 
Q. You gave her no note for those dividends, did you! 
A. I dicl not. 
The witness stands aside .. 
page 88 t By Mr. Caskie : We rest. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Your Honor please, we 
would like to call Miss Dorothy Hughes as an adverse wit-
ness. 
By the Court: Any objection¥ 
By Mr~ Caskie ~ No, sir. 
MISS DOROTHY HUGHES, 
having been first duly sworn, is called as an adverse wit-
ness, and testifies as follows~ 
EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Rosenberger : 
Q. You are Miss Dorothy Hughes, are you not¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the daughter of B. E. Hughes! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you living with him in 1935 and 1936 and prior 
to that time! 
A. Yes. 
Q. In the same house 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were keeping house for· your father, were you 
noU 
A. Yes. 
page 89 ~ Q. At that time- were you teaching at Randolph-
Macon Woman "s College f 
A. Yes. 




Q. You didn't depend on your father to support you¥ 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know wl1en you gave him these stocks, this 
collateral, when you turned them over to him t 
M. E. Knight v. Peoples Nat. Bk. of Lynchburg, et al. 83 
Miss Dorothy Hughes . 
. A... I don't know the date at all. 
Q. Do you know whether it was in '35, '36 or '377 
A. No, I. do not know exactly what the date was. 
Q. Or what year¥ 
A. No, I don't know. It was either '35 or '36 I think but 
I don't remember the date. 
Q. Are you relying on your father for those dates? 
A. No. That is my memory as far as I can remember it. 
Q. Did you take any note or any receipt from your father 
at the time you gave him these collaterals or stocks 7 
A. No, I did not. When he asked me he said, '' I want to 
borrow some of your stock''. He said that he needed some 
of them and I told him that I would lend them to him. He 
said he wanted to borrow them for awhile and he would re-
turn them, and I expected the stock to be returned. 
Q. He said he would return them 7 
page 90 ~ A. Yes. (J. And you expected him to return the stock? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know what he was going· to do with them 7 
A. I didn't ask l1i.in. He said he needed them and I didn't 
ask him. 
Q. Did you know whether he was going to sell them or 
noU 
A. I didn't ask him anything about it. He simply said he 
wanted to borrow them for awhile and when he said he was 
going. to return them I didn't think he would be selling them. 
Q. Then you thought probably he was going to use them 
as collateral as he did t 
A. That is what I exnected him to do. 
Q. vVha t were the valties of the stock at ·the time you turned 
them over to your father, do you remembed 
A. No, I do not remember. 
Q. Have you been paid any interest on account of them 1 
A. No, not any. When the dividends came in I endorsed 
the checks to go to the bank. 
Q. From 1935 or '36 up to the time he gave you the as-
sig_nment in 1.941 did you ask him to pay you or give you 
those stocks back? 
A. No. . 
Q. Did you ever ask him for any payment on 
page 91 ~ account of them 1 
A. No. I was supporting myself. I didn't need 
tho money at the time. 
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Q. You knew he was finandally ih difficulty, did you noU 
A. I did not know to what extent until this morning but 
I knew that he was having some difficulty, yes. . 
Q. At the time you made the assignment from your father 
to the bank was that assig11tnent signed on the same date and 
was it typed on the same pag·e as the assignme.nt to you t 
A. I don ;t 1"emember at all. 
Q. You don't remember anything about the assignment? 
A. What do you mean when you say '' anything about the 
assignment" Y 
Q. The circumstances under which you received it. 
A. I don't ltnow what you expect me to remember. 
Q. Do you remember the date that he gave you the as-
sig·nment to pay you this salary which he would receive from 
the CityY 
A. No, I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. You remember what year it wast 
A. No, I can't. I never tried to keep the years and dates 
in my mind at all. 
Q. Did you ask him for that assignment! Did you ask him 
to make that assignment to you or did he just offer it to 
yout 
A. Well, I think tha.t that was the agreement; 
pag·e 92 r that he owed me the money and that was the one 
. way of paying it. 
Q. :M::y question \Vas, did you ask him for that assignment 
or did he just voluntarily hand it to you? 
A. I don't remember. 
By Mr. Caskie: , V\7 e ohj~ct to this -line of questioning. 
By ].\fr. Rosenberg·er·: 
Q. You don't remember asking him for it f 
A. I don't remember anything at all about asking him. I 
rememher no qu·estions con~erning asking him to pay me. I 
expected him to pay me when he was able to do so. 
Q. You expected him to pay you when he wa.s able. Did 
you ever consider the question that he mig·ht not be able to 
pay youY 
By Mr. Caskie : Obje·eted to as irrelevant. 
By .the Court: I will let her answer that. I overrule your 
objection. 
By the Witness·: I expected him to pay me. 
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By Mr" .Rosenberger: 
Q. When he was able, you testified .. 
A. Yes, but I didn't know he wasn't able, if you insinuate 
he wasn't. 
Q. That assignment to the Peoples Bank, signed by you, 
did you write that or did your father write that, 
page 93 } or did he just hand it to you? 
A. I don't know who wrote it. 
Q. Did you write it? 
A. It was typed, I think. As far as I can recall it was · 
typed, wasn't iU 
Q. Did you have anything to do with that or was that all 
done at your father's instance? 
.A. I don't remember. I have always left all of the de-
tails of the business up te my father. 
Q. Now, I understood him to say that he came to you and 
handed you the ·stock certificates which were in your name 
and asked you to endors~ them; that he.needed some mone1, 
and that you endorsed them arid handed them to him. 
A. Yes, the stock cettificates were in the box in the bank 
and he got them out of the box in the bank where he and I 
have -a joint box. 
Q. And you endors·ed them t 
-A. Yes. 
Q. And turned them over to him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was anything else said or done -at that time other than 
what your father related i 
A. All I remember is he said he ·wanted tt> borrow them. 
I endorsed them and he said he wanted to borrow them for 
awhile and he would return them to me. 
Q. And did he say when he would retuth them Y · 
A. No. I didn't ask him. 
page 94 ~ Q. Miss Hughe~, did you keep any account of 
the time or the value of the stock or the list of the 
stocks that you turned over to him Y 
A. Well, I knew what the stocks were, the three stocks, but 
I didn't keep any list -of the .dates or anything like that., or 
the value of them. 
Q. Or any account against him? 
A. Well, I have got that written down, yes. 
Q. Was that written down-what did you write down t 
A. Simply the fact that he borrowed the stocks but I don't 
rem.emb'e\· the date ·at all. 
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Q. You didn't write down what date be borrowed them f 
A. No, not that I recall. 
Q. ,vheu was anything ever said about the dividends go-
ing to the bank f 
A. I don't remember. All the details were arranged be-
tween the bank and my father. I did not arrange the de-
tails. · 
Q. Did you carry the assig'llment which your father made 
to you from the City, did you carry that around to the City's 
office and give them notice of it or did your father do that? 
A. I didn't go to the City's office. 
Q. You did not g·o with the assignment a.t all yourself? 
A. No, I didn't go to the City's office, no. 
Q. Did yon ever g·o around to the City's office to get the 
check from the City or did the City mail it to you f 
page 95 ~ A. I thoug·ht that the. City was going to mail it 
to the bank. I thought that was the arrangement. 
Q. vVhen did your brothers convey to you their interest 
in this trust fund which came to you in 19341 
A. Sometime in '34-I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. Sometime in '34? 
A. I imagine shortly after the stocks were turned over to 
us by the executors. I don't remember the exact dates. 
Q. What was the consideration of their conveying the 
stocks to you? 
A. They g·ave them to me. 
Q. They gave them to you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you recently convey an interest in a piece of 
property in Campbell County to one of your brothersf 
A. I don 1t know. 
Q. You don't know°! 
A. N~ . 
Q. You don't recall receiving any consideration from your 
brother for the conveyance to him of any piece of property 
in Campbell County within tlle ]ast year or two f 
A. You mean have I g:otten anv money from my brother 
for a piece of property in Campbell County? Not that I know 
anything about. 
Q. And you say you don't recall whether you 
page 96 ~ conveyed him a piece of property or not¥ 
A. I don't know. 
By J.\tir. Caslde: Your Honor, I don't like fo object but 
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the transactions between her and her brother what has that 
g·ot to do with this thing? 
By the Court: I don't see the pertinency or relevancy of 
the relations in the last few years between this young· lady 
and her brother. 
Bv Mr. R.osenberger: I was trying to elicit from the wit-
ness whether she was conveying to her brother pieces of 
property she g·ot from her father. She doesn't remember 
and that's that. 
Q. Miss Hughes, what do you estimate to be the value of 
the farm your father conveyed to you, that is, Cherry Hill, 
as of the time he conveyed it to you f 
By Mr. Caskie: \Ve object. The transaction occurred for 
another debt and another consideration and has nothing to 
do with this and it was conveyed prior to '39 when she bought 
back these stocks. 
By 1VIr. Rosenberger: It has a lot to do with the considera-
tion, the value of the property, when she was accepting it 
for wbat she claims was her debt. 
page 97 r By Mr. Caskie: He didn't owe her this debt at 
that time. 
By the Court: 'l,he witness may answer the question. 
By the Witness: I considered it was worth what had been 
paid for it at the time it was bought, the $1,600.00, and what 
few improvements had been put on it had been put on it with 
my money. 
By Mr. Ros<-mbP.rg<-n·: 
Q. Will you describe the house that was looated on the 
farm? 
A. When it was boug·ht f 
Q. As of the time it was conveyed to you by your father. 
That was in December of 1938, I believe. 
A. December, 1938. 1,Ve didn't move there until 1940. 
Q. Didn't you move there in May of 1939? 
A. No, we moved the 3.rd day of May,.1940. 
Q. Do you remember the condition of the house as of the 
time it was conveyed to you in December, '38? 
A. It still was not in a livable condition. It was really not 
c:)ntirely livable when we moved down there. 
Q. Describe what kind of house it was. 
A. Well, probably I had better go back and say when the 
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house was bought the house was a mere shell. It didn't seem 
to have had any paint on it since the Civil War. The weather-
board had been torn off-plastering all knocked 
page 98 ~ down. In no sense did I consider it a livable place· 
for anyone to live in. We had some of the plaster-
ing· put back and the roof mended where that was off. I 
don't remember just exactly how much else inside had been 
done but I think very little before 1938 when it was · con-
veyed to me because I know it was in the spring of 1940, just 
before we moved down there, that the electric wiring was 
put in and the floor was fixed and the baths were not .put in 
until after we went down to the country, so I would say there 
were no modern improvements on it in 1938 when it was 
bought. The barn had been repaired to some extent but the 
house certainly was not. The plastering was all over the 
floor. 
Q. The point I am driving at-as of the time it was con-
veyed to you what kind of house was itY Was it a stone, 
brick or what? 
A. It is a frame house. 
Q. And what size? How many room? 
A. It had six rooms. We haye added since '38 two rooms 
on the back. 
Q. You have added two rooms on the back. How old a 
house was it f 
A. As far as we know it was there in 1783. 
Q. Did it have old antique floors Y 
A. Upstairs it did. Downstairs the floors were torn all to 
pieces-had to have new floors put in. . · 
Q. The house itself, would it come within the 
page 99 ~ general description of being an old landmark or 
old antique house Y 
A. Of course it had been there a long time but it was in 
such serious condition that if someone hadn't taken it over it 
would have gone all to pieces in a very short time. 
Q. At the time you g·ot it it had been painted, the roof 
had been fixed and the floors had been fixed? 
A. No, the flooring hadn't been fixed when I got it. 
Q. Doors fixed and windows T 
A. Well, I don't think we did anything to the windows 
particularly in the old part of the house. 
Q. What do you value the property to be worth now Y 
A. I know nothing whatsoever about values of property. 
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By the Court : 
Q. ·whose money was spent for the improvements I 
A. Mine. 
Q. All of itY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All of the · improvements made on the place were out 
of your funds Y 
A. Yes, your Honor. We sold off about $500.00 or more 
worth of timber on the place after it was conveyed to me 
and that money was used, along with some from my college 
salary. 
Q. Part of your salary! 
A. Part of my salary and what we got from the timber 
on the place was used to improve the place. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 100 ~ By Mr. Caskie: We have no further evidence. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I take it you rest? 
By Mr. Caskie : Yes. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Your Honor please, I think we can 
stipulate as to the judgment. 
By the Court: Have you any further evidence Y 
By Mr. Rosenberger : My only evidence I have to off er is 
the judgment execution-
By Mr. C~skie : We admit the judgment. 
By the Court: I don't think that is at all necessary in or-
der to determine whether there was consideration for this 
assignment. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Up to this time they had denied it. 
By the Court: I have no objection to you putting any 
stipulation in the record you want to put. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I think it is proper we 
pag·e 101 r stipulate we have a valid judgment; that execu-
tion was issued, properly renewed and is now in 
force and effect, and proper notices were given. 
By Mr. Oaskie: And let me add, we admit the assign-
ments. 
It is agreed by counsel for the parties that Minnie E. 
Knight has a valid judgment, as set up in her claim and 
that the executions and notices attached to the claim were 
~uly issued a,nd served as therein stated. 
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By Mr. Rosenberger: In compliance with Section 6501 
of the Code and that the executions were good and valid-
tha:t the executions issued on the afore said judgments were 
good and valid. 
By the Court: Let the jury retire. 
Note: (The jury retires from the courtroom..) 
By the Court: Let me see your instructions. 
By Mr. Caskie: Your Honor please, we want to make a 
motion first to strike the evidence for Minnie E. Knight on 
the ground there is no evidence to show there was a failure 
of consideration for this assignment and all of the evidence 
is that there was valid consideration for it. There 
page 102 r is 110 conflict in the testimony and there is noth-
ing· for the jury to decide. 
By the Court : In other words, you occupy the position o:L" 
the plain tiff¥ 
By Mr. Caskie: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: Moving to stiike out the evidence of the 
defendant! 
By Mr. Caskie: Moving to strike out the defendant's evi-
dence on the ground that there is no evidence to support it; 
that there is no conflict and nothing for the jury to deter-
mine. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I would also like to make a motion. 
By the Court : Before you make a motion what is your 
reply to thaU 
By Mr. Rosenberger: I think I will get it in my motion. 
My reply to that is that at the time the collateral was given 
to Mr. B. E. Hughes or transferred to Mr. B. E. Hughes by 
Miss Dorothy Hughes, either during the year '35 or '36, 
there was no express contract entered into between them. 
By the Court: Contract of whaU 
page 103 ~ By Mr. Rosenberg·er: To return or repay the 
value of those securities. 
By the Court: Did not both of them testify in substance 
that there was an understanding that the stock was to be 
returned to her? 
By Mr. Rosenberger: She says Mr. Hughes said l1e would 
return the stock. He said that he did not promise her any-
thing but that he would not have borrowed the stock hadn't 
he thoug·ht he would he able to return it or to pay her, and 
it is our position that under that state of facts there is not 
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st1fficient evidence to justify an express contract between 
father and daughter, and since there is no express contract 
established between them as of 1935 and 1936 that therefore 
there is no consideration on which to base this assignment 
of 1941. and that the evidence being what it is-
By the Court: (interposing) First, I don't follow you as 
to express contract. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: This is the distinction which I make 
and should make clear. 
By the Court: You are eon tending it took an express con-
tract¥ 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Yes, sir. 
page 104 ~ By the Court : How do you get at this 1 
By Mr. Rosenberger: :B.,or this reason, as be-
tween strangers, that if I deliver to you my property the 
law will imply a promise on your part to return it to me, and 
enforce an implied contract, but where the relationship of 
father and daughter exists that the law implies no such im-
plied promise on the part of one to the other. 
By the Court: That is where the borrower says: ''Lend 
me your stock. '' 1 
By Mr. R,osenberger: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: And the lender says, "All right, I will lend 
it to you. "f 
By Mr. Rosenberger: That that is not an express con-
tract. 
By the Court: To do what f 
By Mr. Rosenberger: To return it at any definite time or 
to pay the value for it. 
By the Court: What is it f 
page 105 ~ By 1vlr. Rosenberger: Under the la.wit is pre-
sumed to be a gift where it is between the father 
and daughter. 
By the Court: Where the borrower says, "Lend me some-
thing''? 
By Mr. Rosenberg·er: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: And if a member of a family complies with 
the re1uest to lend somebody something that that in law is 
a gift? 
By Mr. Rosenberger: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: Show me the authority on that. Have you 
got anv Virginia ca!Se dealing· with that? 
· Ry Mr. Rosenberger: Yes, sir. 
Note: (The further argument of counsel and references 
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to authorities is here omitted, after which the court made the 
following· ruling· on the motions to strike the evidence.) 
By the Court: I feel very frankly the positive evidence 
and the circumstantial evidence is that this stock was not 
transferred. If it had been intended as a gift Mr. Hughes 
would have it transferred to his name and would have used 
it as his. It is a fact he agreed that the bank 
page 106 ~ would receive the dividends and that she re-
ceived the checks for the dividends and endorsed 
them and handed them -over to the bank, and the positive tes-
timony of the father and daughter is it was a lo_an of the 
stock to be used as collateral. It is obvious that the purpose 
of both parties was simply to let him have the use of his 
daug·hter's stock to be used as collateral and from that date 
everything done is perfectly consistent with that being the 
fact and I really feel that if the jury were to return a verdict 
to the contrary I would have to set it aside. Now, with that 
feeling in my mind that I would have to set aside the verdict 
if the jury reached any other d:inding on this evidence I am 
going to strike out any evidence of the defendant's in this 
case and sustain your motion. 
Now, if you gentlemen want to except to that you can take 
your time and take your exceptions. 
By Mr. Rosenberger: The defendant, Minnie E·. Knight, 
by counsel, objects to the action of the court in striking out 
the evidence of the defendants and thereby taking from the 
jury the determination of the issue as to whether or not there 
was valid consideration for the assignment of November 27th, 
1941, between B. E. Hughes and his daughter, 
page 107 ~ Dorothy Hug·hes, on the ground that the trans-
action under which the last mentioned parties 
base the consideration for the aforesaid assignment was · a 
trans£ er or delivery of stock of Dorothy Hughes, which was 
endorsed by her in blank, under no ·date, and without the 
date of the endorsement, which resulted in relinquishing en-
tire control and ownership of the stock for all purposes to 
the bearer of the certificate, and at the time she delivered 
those stock certificates to her father, according to her own 
evidence, he made no express promise to return the stock cer-
tificates to her but said merely that he intended to return them 
to her or he would not have borrowed them, and she at the 
time stated that she expected him to return the stock or the 
value of the same to her when he was able. 
Under the circumstances, where no written receipt was 
taken or given, no obligation executed to evidence the amount 
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of the value of the- stock transfer, no interest ever paid, no 
demand ever made by the alleged daug·hter creditor upon 
her father for the payment of the value of the stock or the 
return of the stock itself; that on another occasion when a 
business transaction ohtained between the parties Mr. Hughes 
executed three or four negotiable notes to evi-
page 108 } dence the money which he borrowed from his 
daughter; that the daughter, Miss Dorothy 
Hughes, made no request for the assignment of November, 
1941, nor had anything to do with its execution other than 
the re-assig·nment by her to the Peoples National Bank to 
cover her indebtedness for the purchase of certain collaterals 
which were turned over to her in May, 1939, then under the 
facts and circumstances reasonable men might differ as to 
whether or not that transaction constituted consideration 
deemed valuable in law-that is, the transaction between the 
father and daughter-it is the position of this defendant that 
no express contract resulted whereby the daughter could 
legally enforce her claim against the father for the return of 
the stock or the value of the same, and that that being the 
case that transaction was not consideration deemed valuable 
in law for the later assignment of 1941. The indebtedness 
of the plaintiff preceded the stock transfer in '35 or '36 and 
the judgment of the complainant, Minnie E. Knight, pre-
ceded the assignment of November, 1941. This is all further 
supported by the fact that the father paid the daughter for 
other obligations and indebtedness but never made any at-
tempt to pay prior to this assignment of 1941, even though 
in the year 1938 he had the same salary as as-
page 109 r sessor of city real estate, and the defendant, Min-
nie E. Knight, by counsel, excepts to the court's 
ruling· for the reasons stated. 
By the Court : I think that is broad enough. 
Note: (The jury is brought back into the courtroom.) 
By the Court: (addressing the Jury) Gentlemen of the 
Jury, the court strikes out all evidence offered or elicited 
on behalf of Minnie E. Knight to the effect that there was 
no consideration for this lending of stock by Miss Hughes 
to her father upon which the basis of the assignment in 
question was founded. In other words, there is no evidence 
before you except such evidence as relates to the point that 
there was consideration for the assignment. You may re-
tire to your room and consider your verdict and return your 
verdict whether or not this assignment was founded on con-
sideration .. 
94 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Note: (The jury having retired to the jury room and hav-
ing remained there for some time was called back into the 
courtroom by the court.) 
By the Court: ( addressing the jury.) Gentlemen, the court 
rung for you because it thought possibly due to the unusual-
ness of this case you did not quite understand the court as 
to your duty and what type of verdict you should 
page 110 ~ render. Have you agreed on a verdicU 
By one of the Jurors: We have, your Honor. 
Note : The Clerk reads the verdict which is as follows: 
''We, the jury, find there was no consideration for the as-
signment. 
''H. M. BECK, Foreman.'' 
By the Court : Are there any motions f 
By Mr. Caskie: I move to set aside that verdict and en-
ter up judgment in accordance with the instructions of the 
court. 
By the Court: That motion will be sustained. 
By Mr. Caskie : Or will the jury retire and reconsiderf 
By the Court : The motion is sustained and the verdict 
of the jury is set. aside. And it appearing to the court, as 
a matter of law, that there was a legal and valuable consid-
eration for the assignment it is the judg·ment of the court 
that Peoples National Bank recover of the City of Lynch-
burg the amount due which I understand is $1,833.36, the 
amount due under the assig'llment made by B. E. 
page 111 ~ Hughes of the compensation due from the City to 
him as ,m assessor of city real estate. 
By Mr. Caskie: It seems to me the costs should go against 
1\Irs. Knight. The City wasn't interested. The City was al-
wavs readv and wilJing· to pay .. 
By the Court: I have some doubts about that. The Peo-
ples National Bank brought the action against the Citv to 
recover on this assignment that had been reassigned. · 
By :Mr. Caskie: The City comes in and says "We have 
the monev and are willhrn; to pay it all to whoever is entitled 
to have it'' and Mrs. Knight came in and made the claim 
and made this proceeding- necessary. 
Bv the Court: Not until you brought the suit. 
By Mr. Caskie: We had to bring the suit because the 
Cl 
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City couldn't pay it. If :Mrs. Knight hadn't come in there 
would have been no costs. The issue is between the plain-
tiffs and :Mrs. Minnie E. Knght. 
By the Court: I reckon you are right about that, and 
the court may allow costs to parties substantially prevail-
ing. The court didn't have in mind that the Qity 
page 112 ~ itself would pay it but was thinking whether the 
costs would be paid out of the funds in the City's 
hands~ I think equity in this case, with the holder of the as-
signment prevailing-, would require that the costs be placed 
against l\frs. Minnie E. Knight., and in that order you may 
add that. 
By Mr. R.osenberg·er: The defendant, :Minnie E. Knight, 
by counsel, objects to the action of the court in setting aside 
of the verdict of the jury for the same reasons stated in ob-· 
jecting to the court's action in directing a verdict for the 
plaintiffs or in striking out any evidence in contradiction to 
the fact there was not any consideration for the assignment, 
nnd thereby directing the jury to return its verdict that there 
was consideration for the assignment. Defendant, Minnie 
E. Knig·ht, by counsel, also moves the court to set aside the 
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs and to enter a 
judgment in favor of the defendant, Minnie E. Knight; that 
the judgment in favor of the Peoples National Bank, that 
they should recover the funds in this cause, should be set 
aside on tl1e grouu<l that the assignment made by B. E. 
Hughes to Dorothy Hughes was void, invalid and unenforce-
able on the gTound that it does not comply with -Section 6555a 
of the Code of Virginia. I want to reiterate all 
page 113 ~ of the objections we have taken, and further, that 
the assig·nment of B. E. Hu~;hes is illegal, void 
and unenforceable for the reason that it is an assignment 
by the Citv Official of unearned salary due him and is against 
public policy; and third, that the evidence adduced before 
this jurv is suf,ficient for it to base a verdict that the assign-
ment of B. E. Hug·hes to his daug·hter, Dorothy Hughes, was 
without co11sideration deemed valid in law. 
Bv the Court: The motion is overruled. 
B:v Mr. Rosen ber~rer: The defendant, Minnie E. Knight, 
obiects and excepts for the reasons stated. 
We would 1ike for the order to Q;ive us a suspension. 
By 1:he Court: You have to make your motion. 
By Mr. Rosenber~rer: We move the court to withhold exe-
~ntion upon the :iudgment and to allow a suspension of thirty 
clRvs to ~'ive us time to perfect an appeal. 
By the Court: Is that your motion, for thirty days? 
96 
;...HJP'(f'!l' ( 11 1.J ~- · l> ,, Hal· · · · ·111.··1· 
Supre~~ Court ~f Appeal~ of Vi~gi~ia 
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... :,. . _ _By l\I:r. R,osenbe1·ger: Yes, sir. 
pag·e 114 ~ By the Court; What bond i , . 
··· : · .. , ·By Mr: Caskie: I suppose a bond of $200.00. 
By · the· Q_o1;1.rt: . Execution will · be suspended for thirty 
days upon .. cpnsicl~ration that the bond be given within ten 
days in the penalty of $200.00. 
I 
page 115 ~ • • • • ' _; I CERTIFICATE. 
•, I 1 ! J I , ~ ; 1 
,I, S; \DuVal: Martin, tT udg·e of the Corporation Court for 
the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, who presided over the fore-
gqing t_rial of The Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, B. 
E. Hug·hes. &nd: Dorothy Hughes v~rsus City of Lynchburg 
and ¥innie;E. l{;nig-ht~ in .said.court, at Lynchburg, Virginia, 
on -April 26th; 11943; -do certify that the foregoing is a true 
and corneot.copy and,,J1eport of all of the evidence adduced, 
the :objootipns,.to .evidence, or any part thereof, offered, ad-
mitted, rejected .or- .stricken· out, ,and : the objections to the 
ruling·s thereon,,and other· incidents of the said trial of the 
said case, with the objections and exceptions of the respective 
pa:r..tie~ 1a&· therein set, forth. 
i ·And I ,do further, ~ertify ·that the attorneys for the parties, 
T,he! Peoples ·Nati.o;nal Bank of Lynchburg, B. E. Hughes, 
Dorothy .Hughes '.and City of Lynchburg, had reasonable no-
tice in writing; ·given by,· counsel for the defendant Minnie 
E. Knight; pf, the time and place when the foregoing report 
of the , tesitimony, ,objections· and . exc.eptions and other inci-
denta: .of .the trial-would be tendered· and presented to the un-
der~igned for signature and authentication; and pursuant to 
said. notice, this: said· report and certificate was tendered to 
me . on the 12th day of ~May, 1943. '. 
Given under my:hand,this 12th day of May, 1943, pursuant 
to .. rule 21 of the .Sapreme Court of Appeals · of Virginia and 
within, sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in 
said cause. 
... 
1·,1·~,· ,· , · ·S. DuVAL MARTIN, 
.Judg·e of .the Corporation Court for the City 
of Lynchburg·, Virg'inia. · 
page 116 ~ I,, Hubert H. Martin, Clerk of t~e Corporation 
. ·. · ·Court· f 0:1.·~ the City of Lynchburg~,· Virginia, do 
certify that: the £oregoing. report of the te·stimony, objec-
tions, exceptions an<il .other ineidents of the trial in the case 
of The. Peoples National Bank of Lynchburg, B. E. Hughes 
and Dorothy Hughes versus City of Lynchburg and Minnie 
M. E. Knight v. Peoples Nat. Bk. of Lynchburg, et al 97 
E. Knight, all of which has been duly authenticated by the 
Judge of said court, was lodged and filed with me as Clerk 
of the said court on the 12th day of May, 1943. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, 
Clerk of the Corporation Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
I, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of the corporation court for 
the city of Lynchburg, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record of the case of Peoples National Bank 
of Lync.b.burg and B. E. Hughes and Dorothy Hughes, plain-
tiffs, v. City of Lynchburg and Minnie E. Knight, and I fur-
ther certify that notices as required by Section 6253-f and 
Section 6339 of the Code were duly given as appears by paper 
writing~ filed with· the record of said case. The olerk's fee 
for making this transcript is $30.00. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of May, 1943. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. W .A.TTS, C. C. 
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